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Arms Control

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ARMS CONTROL

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USSR: DIFFERING RATIONALES FOR SDI EXAMINED

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by A. Lopukhin: "Master Key to Parity?" under rubric entitled SDI: Madness of the Century]

[Text] Four years ago the President of the United States suddenly revealed his most cherished dream. One day in March 1983, in a televised address to the country, he totally unexpectedly first talked about defensive weapons: "What if we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our territory or that of our allies?"

Reagan then called upon American scientists to devote their talents to the service of mankind and the cause of peace throughout the world, and create the means which "will deprive nuclear weapons of their power and make them obsolete." Thus came to light the extensive research program later called the "strategic defense initiative" [SDI].

Of course, many Americans, grown tired of the fear of mutual guaranteed destruction, were impressed that, as their President asserted, thanks to SDI the possibility of a nuclear attack on them would be eliminated forever. They watched with satisfaction the television where publicity strips were then appearing in which enemy missiles bounced off a magical rainbow like little balls, reliably protecting the entire capitalist world. With just the right touch Senator Edward Kennedy started calling the SDI program "star wars."

The White House, it is true, at first was not very happy with this label, since it removed from SDI the propaganda advantage of a peace-making patina. But soon consolation was found. "Star wars," just the same was perceived as something fantastic, and therefore not dangerous. Star wars are associated with an alluring picture, in which the battlefield is outer space, hundreds of kilometers remote, filled with robots and unmanned stations firing at each other with exotic weapons. In any case, Americans had already seen this at the movies. So "star wars" is not such a bad idea.

Apropos of this, although it was not expected, it appeared on fertile ground. It matured in America in the soil of the fear of a nuclear Armageddon and is nourished by a naive faith in mighty technological "muscles." Nor did the fears of the VPK [military-industrial complex] play the least role. It felt

an insistent need for a large-scale program to produce qualitatively new weapons, in order to support its routine "gold fever" for the coming decades.

Yes, the President's dream was good for everyone, except for one thing. It was illusory. Even prominent critics of SDI say that they would favor it if they considered it realizable. In America disputes about SDI are already not about how realizable it is, but about to what degree it is unrealistic. American scientists, having studied SDI collectively and individually, are practically unanimous. It is impossible in principle to create a 100 percent effective space defense, even if the Soviet Union, improbably, did not concern itself about retaliatory measures.

"I was scarcely in raptures from President Reagan's speech about "star wars" when I read it," wrote former U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in NEWSDAY. "As one of the creators of the existing ABM Treaty I instinctively oppose the idea of changing this treaty.

"Moreover, 100 percent reliable protection of the civilian population, which, judging by everything, this speech promised, is a mirage; even with a defense which is 90 percent effective enough weapons will get through to destroy inevitably a large part of the population."

Let us add that even an almost fantastic 99.9 percent impenetrability of space defense -- even this does not make the President's dream a reality -- there have become too many weapons in the world. Ashton Carter, a physicist from Harvard University, in a report ordered by the Congressional Bureau on Technical Assessments, concluded that a complete or almost complete space defense is a "matter so far in the future that it must not serve as the basis for the nation's hopes or for national policy."

However, the President's dream of opening an "umbrella" over the country so strong that it would provide an absolute defense against nuclear missiles, is still alive. Moreover, billions of dollars have already been spent on researching this hypnotic idea of erecting a "Maginot Line" in space, and no one knows accurately how much more will be required. Some say a trillion, others more, others less. It is logical to ask whether practical Americans are really capable of flinging billions at a hopeless cause. This question might bring anyone to sober reflection, but not the advocates of SDI, who, moreover, are experienced in political life in the United States.

The fact is that SDI is no longer SDI. At least there is no single understanding of "star wars." And from this great confusion is occurring in the minds of the Americans, as well as in the interpretation of how SDI will be created.

The U. S. President continues to believe in his dream; i. e., in a completely impenetrable anti-missile shield. Former U. S. Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara calls this "Star Wars I." About this understanding of SDI the disputes are mainly about how many decades, three or five, will be needed to create a more or less reliable space defense. A fundamental question is also posed: can a defense against nuclear weapons be considered advisable if it does not provide a 100 percent guarantee?

Those who think that it can do so believe, according to MacNamara, in "Star Wars II," or partial defense. It is also called "porous" or "economical." But this is entirely different from what Reagan proclaimed four years ago.

This is an obvious substitution for the President's dream and an attempt to foist on Americans a program which is "full of holes." Even Reagan's most loyal advisors on technical problems, writes the LOS ANGELES TIMES, are evasive and have a sorrowful countenance when they are asked whether they can remove the fear of Americans about Soviet nuclear weapons which, as far as can be judged, the President promised in his most reckless statements.

Nobel Prize winner (Hans Bete):

If we enter the path of creating space weapons this will ensure an arms race and instability for the next 20 years. If our efforts in this field are successful defensive systems may gain the upper hand over offensive weapons. However, in all probability, we will conduct an arms race as before, and offensive missiles will just the same be able to overcome the defensive systems.

The plans which our government is developing now seem aggressive to the Soviet Union. They will not give us an advantage in time, but will only lead to intensifying the antagonism between us. It is senseless to think that Soviet Union intends to carry out a total nuclear strike.

Lowell French, professor, Chicago University:

The new types of weapons being created within the framework of "star wars" are not defensive. As soon as all of these lasers, computers and missile systems are created almost no additional effort will be required to use them for an attack.

So, in Washington they may talk about the attractiveness of SDI-I and have in mind the crippled SDI-II. Although Reagan himself stated on 23 March 1983: "In combination with offensive systems they (defensive systems -- A. L.) may be viewed as a factor which facilitates an aggressive policy, no one wants this." In reality, many Western specialists acknowledge that a defense which does not provide 100 percent security can lead only to a gigantic leap in the race of offensive nuclear weapon, "when countermeasures are met by countermeasures," and thereby reduce the existing stability. Moreover, SDI in its first or second variant is not only a shield. If space weapons are created they will also be able to destroy ground targets -- military equipment, petroleum storage, crops... it is also believed that the lasers will be able to kill people from space and cause fires in populated areas.

To make the replacement of the President's dream more difficult to detect, recently the Pentagon stated that the technological capability had already been achieved to deploy the first elements of a partial space defense in 1993-1994. By these actions the U. S. would violate the ABM Treaty -- the key agreement in the area of nuclear weapons control. This treaty also ties the

hands of those who are hastening to begin testing of space based weapons. Therefore, "broad thinking" is now becoming popular in Washington. This is natural, when it concerns a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, which the Pentagon needs to legalize future weapons tests in the "Star Wars II" program.

The U. S. President faces a difficult choice. On the one hand he understands that implementation of his idea in a variant which is full of holes may undermine faith in the SDI dream, through which he hopes to reserve a place for himself in the history books. On the other hand, the current administration will be in power approximately another 600 days. And might not the next occupant of the White House, if his hands and feet are not tied in good time, bury the SDI dream, and with it Reagan's chance to stay in the memory of future generations? Due to this danger underhanded plotting about the ABM Treaty has begun, in order to give the "green light" to SDI, foist it on future U. S. administrations and thus immortalize the President's dream.

Yes, and the question of its financing is becoming rather acute. The advocates of "star wars" in Congress are talking insistently about the fact that it is already time to demonstrate the viability of SDI. Otherwise, it will die away in the scientist's laboratories without multi-billion dollar "stimulants." Lobbyists for the "star complex" are also operating actively. For them SDI is the chick which may grow up to be the chicken that lays the golden egg. Arms suppliers, whose perception of the world is limited to the columns of financial ledgers, are unable to understand the lessons of history. Its pages, as Dr. Herbert York, one of President Eisenhower's advisors on science and technology, stated are replete with "Maginot lines." Therefore, for healthy-minded people the lesson of history is to extract from it lessons which the advocates of the nuclear race have not learned.

Thus, the SDI dream, despite its unreality, has nevertheless become a reality. So far it has become a political reality. What price will America pay in order to learn the simple truth that an umbrella full of holes does not save them from a downpour? Yes, and even an impenetrable umbrella will hardly help a man keep dry who is bogged down in a marshy swamp. Here it is necessary to seek not an umbrella, but a solid road in order to get out of the swamp of the nuclear race.

AS THIS ISSUE WAS GOING TO PRESS:

On the fourth anniversary of the day the "star wars" program was proclaimed, President Reagan made a special statement. On the occasion of the "anniversary" of his beloved child -- the program for creating a large-scale antimissile defense system with space-based elements -- the occupant of the White House did not scrimp on glorification. He praised the "remarkable progress" in implementation of SDI, and assured that this program "truly serves the goals of reducing offensive weapons," and that it supposedly "can help us advance toward a less dangerous world. The President also asserted that "the capabilities of SDI will never be used for offensive purposes."

More and more American specialists are coming out against the policy of militarization of space which is being implemented by official Washington. "The 'star wars' program," notes Robert Bowman, president of the Institute for the Study of Problems of Space and Security, "does not have anything to do with defense. It represents a blatant U. S. attempt to achieve military superiority through the development of new types of offensive weapons."

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CSO: 5200/1444

PRAVDA CITES AMERICAN JURIST AGAINST ABM TREATY BROAD INTERPRETATION

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by D. Tuzmukhamedov: "Weighty Arguments"]

[Text] Although the book by the prominent American jurist (A. Sherr), "Legal Analysis of the 'New Interpretation' of the ABM Treaty" is not large in size, its well argued statements, the care of its legal analysis and, most of all, the importance of the problem to which it is devoted are attracting to this work public attention in various countries. The publication contains convincing criticism of the so-called "broad" interpretation of the 1972 treaty on limitation of antiballistic missile systems. This interpretation has been advanced by the current American administration to justify deployment of an ABM system with space-based elements, in accordance with the notorious SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program. Let us recall that the essence of the "broad" interpretation amounts to proving that supposedly the "Star Wars" program not only does not contradict, but is almost sanctioned by the 1972 treaty.

(A. Sherr), president of the American public organization, Alliance of Jurists for Control Over Nuclear Weapons, is a specialist who is well acquainted with both international and American law, who has repeatedly published on the most topical problem of our day: How to deflect the nuclear threat hanging over mankind. Referring not only to the ABM Treaty itself, but also to documents called in legal language "means of interpretation" (materials from the negotiations, practical application of the treaty), (A. Sherr) demonstrates convincingly the dangerous consequences to which undermining the ABM Treaty, this most important brake in the path of the arms race, may lead.

In the foreword to his book, the former head of the American delegation at the SALT-I talks, G. Smith, characterized the work of (A. Sherr) as "accurately reflecting the history, aims and meaning of the treaty." The book contains statements by government officials, congressmen and, strange as it may seem, excerpts from a report by the Organization for Implementation of SDI presented to Congress in 1985, which indicate the groundlessness of the interpretation on which the White House insists. But it is not even a matter of this. The main thing, and this is disclosed rather fully in the book, is that the treaty itself in the form in which it was signed, ratified and applied by the two sides, unambiguously prohibits the creation, testing and deployment of sea,

air, space or mobile ground-based ABM systems or components. This prohibition, notes (A. Sherr), extends to the ABM systems and components being developed within the SDI framework.

The U. S. administration, attempting to prove the opposite, is deliberately distorting the text of the treaty and its integral part, Coordinated Statement D. Washington asserts hypocritically in this regard that the "broad" interpretation is supposedly aimed at strengthening the treaty and increasing its effectiveness! (A. Sherr) called this an absurd argumentation which is leading to the cheapening of the treaty.

The author warns that the "broad" interpretation, which is distorting the main idea of the treaty, is undermining prospects for a halt to the arms race. "The ABM Treaty," he writes, "was not only built on the premise that the strict prohibitions placed on ABM systems would stop the race of offensive and defensive weapons, but also on the understanding that, as it is stated in the preamble, the agreement achieved would facilitate the creation of more favorable conditions for subsequent negotiations on limiting strategic weapons."

(A. Sherr) believes that the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty is illegal and, in addition to what has already been stated, is damaging the national interest and security of the U. S. itself. Therefore, writes (A. Sherr), the American administration should reject attempts at such an interpretation and confirm its adherence to the initial, true objectives of the treaty. Otherwise the U. S. Congress must do so, declaring the "broad" interpretation unconstitutional.

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CSO: 5200/1444

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 19 MAY

U.S. ABM Treaty Interpretation

LD191406 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1314 GMT 19 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 19 May (TASS) -- Concerning the report published a few days ago by the U.S. Administration of a State Department legal advisor with reasons for a "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Boris Pyadishev, first deputy head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate said today at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry Press Center that this is not the first attempt of this sort. It is known, he said, that in October 1985 the State Department already tried to prove the admissibility of a "broad" interpretation, citing for this purpose materials from congressional hearings during the ratification of the ABM Treaty. However, an objective analysis of these materials and of official statements of the U.S. Administration confirmed the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty, under which a "broad" interpretation has no grounds.

Now in a new report, the same legal adviser from the U.S. State Department is trying to use certain working details of Soviet-U.S. talks in formulating an ABM Treaty. Even setting aside the ethical issue of unilaterally revealing materials that had hitherto been considered confidential, certain uncoordinated reports by the U.S. delegation on the progress of the talks were clearly selected and prepared so as to ensure that they corresponded with the designs of the report's compilers, stressed the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Nonetheless, not one of the materials cited by the U.S. delegation mentions that either side at any time in the talks cast doubt on the pledge not to create [sozdavat], test, or deploy sea, air, space, or mobile ground based ABM systems or components. All the records of the U.S. delegation now published concern discussions by the sides at the talks of only the question of possible future ABM systems or components based on different principles of physics which are capable of replacing components of the system permitted under the treaty -- stationary ground bases in a certain area -- but certainly not components of systems which are banned under the treaty -- that is, sea, air, space or mobile land-based.

So even the new report could not cast doubt on the real content of the ABM Treaty, which the USSR and the United States used as a starting point in concluding and ratifying it and throughout the many years during which it operated.

It is regrettable that the State Department is again trying to distort the truth and shows a clear lack of objectivity in its approach to the ABM Treaty, which is of fundamental significance to the process of limiting and reducing weapons.

Opinion Poll on NST

LD191400 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1337 GMT 19 May 87

[Text] Moscow 19 May (TASS) -- In recent days the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate, with the assistance of the Institute of Sociological Research under the USSR Academy of Sciences, carried out a public opinion poll in Moscow on issues of disarmament, said Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate at a news briefing today. Around 1,000 Muscovites from various walks of life were questioned.

The poll showed that the Soviet people are paying attention to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. The majority of those polled -- 57 percent -- believe that a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe will be reached. Three percent thought the conclusion of such an agreement impossible.

Almost one in five indicated that this agreement would be evidence of a radical turning point in the process of disarmament talks between the USSR and the United States.

The results of the poll, said the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, have confirmed the generally negative attitude of the Moscow public to the U.S. Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative. Six-seven percent of those questioned stated that they see in SDI a very serious threat to the cause of peace.

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CSO: 5200/1500

MOSCOW JAPANESE ON JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN SDI

OW101003 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 7 May 87

[Sergeyev commentary: "On Japan's Participation in the U.S. SDI--Strategic Defense Initiative--Program"]

[Excerpts] Will Japan participate in the implementation of space militarization plans after all? It seems to be doing so shortly, possibly as early as in the middle of this month. Japanese newspapers report that compilation has been completed of the major themes of Japanese participation in the SDI program,

What are the reasons for the Japanese leadership to take part in SDI--the "Star Wars" plan? Since Japan became an economic giant, a prevailing view among its leadership has been that Japan's political role in the world should be enhanced commensurate with its economic strength. What they mean is that its economic resources should be used for a military buildup,

Military buildup in terms of conventional arms has its limits. It is particularly so at present as Article 9 of the Constitution [on renouncing war] remains valid. Some conservative politicians have called for Japan's nuclear armament but have failed to win the support of the people, who experienced the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies. Nevertheless, Japanese leaders believe that participation in the SDI program will enable them to satisfy their ambition and enhance the nation's prestige. But, will such participation really strengthen Japan's security?

Experts point out that as far as the Japanese archipelago is concerned, with its high density of population and industrial facilities, no ballistic nuclear missile system can possibly prevent damage by a strike. Since the SDI program does not even aim to provide defense for the entire continental United States, the experts' view can be said to be 100 percent correct. The act of labeling space militarization as a defense initiative is in itself an attempt to mislead the public.

The U.S. Government has ignored the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing which lasted for a year and a half, creating doubts about the so-called peace-loving stance of the United States. We often hear that the United States has increasingly been pressuring Japan to participate in the SDI

program. What we have heard is true indeed, and the pressure applied has not been a minor one.

Nevertheless, no pressure could have led to Japan's inclination toward SDI participation if the Japanese leadership lacked the will to respond favorably. The reason is that Japan has sufficient political ammunition to avoid participation in space militarization if only its leadership had the will to do so. This ammunition includes such things as the nation's three nonnuclear principles, the Diet resolution concerning the peaceful use of space, and the ban on arms exports.

As everyone knows, the Japanese Government is displaying a political inclination of ignoring those principles and resolutions instead of using them to ward off U.S. pressure.

The Japanese leadership, prepared to scuttle Japan's own declaration of peace and international agreements, is, in fact, permitting destruction of the international and legal foundations of world stability. This somehow affects Japan's prestige and the three nonnuclear principles Japan proclaimed.

The present situation indicates that the Japanese Government, unfortunately, is not prepared to view the world from a new angle. Those who view Japan's future in terms of global military configurations are essentially devoting their efforts to destroying the present possibilities for freeing the world from the threat of nuclear arms.

/9274
CSO, 5200/1500

USSR: UPGRADE OF GREENLAND RADAR VIOLATES ABM TREATY

PM071247 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[Article by Major General Yu. Lebedev under rubric "Readers Request Information": "Radar Station in Greenland and Washington's Subterfuge" -- first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "Newspapers make fairly frequent reference to the American radar station in Greenland. It has also been featured in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Nevertheless, I still do not understand why the creation of this radar station is at variance with the ABM Treaty. More information please."

Reserve Colonel M. Savin, Leningrad.

For several years the United States has been building a new multifunction radar station for a ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) at its military base in Greenland. This radar station is being constructed next to existing BMEWS radar stations built there before the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty was signed. This treaty permits the United States to retain these earlier BMEWS radar stations and keep them, including those on foreign territory, in their original positions. But strict limitations were imposed on the creation of new BMEWS radar stations after 1972: This kind of radar station may be sited only on the periphery of one's national territory; the placing of BMEWS radar stations on foreign territory is prohibited by Article 6 of the ABM Treaty. Even the most cunning treaty "interpreters" in the White House and the Pentagon cannot claim that Greenland is U.S. national territory. We will also note that, not limiting itself to Greenland, the United States has begun building a similar radar station in Britain.

It is therefore clear that building new U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Britain is not in accordance with the ABM Treaty.

The United States cannot be unaware of the unlawfulness of its actions. In an attempt to justify itself in the eyes of the world public opinion, the American administration is trying to "legitimize" the building of the new radar station in Greenland and pass off the work in progress as "modernization" of its old BMEWS stations.

What can be said in this connection? It is absurd to talk of any "modernization" when, figuratively speaking, a nuclear power plant is built in the place of a firewood stove. But this is exactly what is happening in Greenland, where the new radar station bears no resemblance to the previous one in terms of either equipment or potential. All the key components of the new radar station are new creations: an antenna system

based on a different (from the previous antenna system) principle of operation -- a "phased array" -- which gives the station a substantially more powerful performance and new potential (the new antenna is a six-tiered construction reaching a height of approximately 28 meters); a new "brain" for the station -- a rapid-response computer complex with a new generation of computers; and a modern control center appropriate to the station's new technical level and potential.

These are the facts. They are irrefutable evidence that the United States has no grounds for talking about modernization, because it is deploying a new phased-array radar station in breach of the ABM Treaty.


The 1972 ABM Treaty makes strict provisions regarding the permitted locations for siting large phased-array radar stations, basing these provisions on the intended purpose of these radar stations. Radar stations of this kind can only be built in ABM system deployment areas or at ABM test sites (in the capacity of ABM radar stations), on the periphery of the national territory of the country in question (in the capacity of BMEWS radar stations) -- outward looking and for the purpose of tracking objects in space or for use as national technical verification equipment. The new BMEWS phased-array radar station being built by the United States in Greenland does not correspond to any of the deployment regions or intended purposes permitted by the ABM Treaty.

So why is the United States proceeding with actions that are flagrantly in breach of its treaty obligations? We will consider the station's potential in order to answer this question.

The commissioning of the new radar station in Greenland will make it possible to have radar coverage of a considerably larger sector of the Arctic than was feasible with the old stations, increase the time available for tracking objects appearing from the north, and considerably enhance the potential for tracking a number of objects simultaneously. The technical specifications of the new station exceed BMEWS requirements: The information provided by the radar station will make it possible to assess the scale of an enemy nuclear missile attack and determine the location and expected warhead impact coordinates with an accuracy sufficient for targeting ABM missile complexes. Locating this radar station outside U.S. territory ensures advance detection of targets in the time needed for the early allocation of targets and for ensuring that they are intercepted in the furthest reaches of the ABM complex strike zones. It is with the aim of gaining these military advantages that the United States has built the new radar station in Greenland, ignoring the ABM Treaty requirements in this respect. It is becoming clear why Washington has needed to deceive public opinion, because Washington knows best of all how matters really stand. It is important to point out in this connection that the idea of "modernizing" the radar station in Greenland was repeatedly turned down by previous American administrations on the grounds that it ran counter to the ABM Treaty.


The unlawful U.S. establishment of a BMEWS radar station outside its national territory erodes the principles of the ABM Treaty. Yet that treaty is the foundation on which future Soviet-U.S. accords in the sphere of limiting, reducing, and ultimately totally eliminating strategic offensive weapons can be built. Attempts to weaken this treaty, and especially attempts to derail it, can only lead to a new, uncontrollable twist in the arms race spiral, notably in space.

This is what certain U.S. circles are aiming at, incidentally. The present Washington administration is following their lead. It has already refused to abide by the SALT-I interim agreement and the SALT-II treaty. And now, as we can see, it is the turn of the ABM Treaty.



Key

1. U.S.
2. Radar Station
3. Greenland
4. USSR
5. Coverage of present U.S. BMEWS radar in Greenland
6. Coverage of new phased-array radar in Greenland
7. Zone of vision of new phased-array radar station in Greenland
8. Barrier zone of present radar station in Greenland
9. U.S.
10. USSR
11. The Barrier Zone is an electromagnetic field that registers objects poking through it



- 11 Барьерная зона представляет собой электромагнитное поле, регистрирующее прохождение объектов через него.

I must also draw attention to another point of considerable importance. Those countries which indulge the United States and do not oppose the construction of new American BMEWS radar stations on their territory become, willy-nilly, accessories to the process of undermining international treaties.

This development of events cannot fail to cause concern in everyone who cherishes the cause of peace. Discussions among the Danish public (Greenland is part of Denmark) regarding the American BMEWS radar station in Greenland show no signs of abating, for example. The problem has even been a matter of debate in the Danish Folketing (parliament). A resolution passed by the Folketing instructs the government to do everything possible to ensure that the aforementioned radar station is not used for offensive purposes and is not brought into operation as part of preparations for "Star Wars." [paragraph continues]

The Danish Government, the resolution states, must urge the United States and the USSR to continue to adhere to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This demand is really intended for the United States, because our country is already in favor of unconditional fulfillment of this treaty.

So, Comrade Savin, this is how matters really stand with the new American radar station in Greenland. The danger lies not only and not so much in the station itself as in the U.S. departure from the ABM Treaty. That is why the Soviet Union cannot fail to react to the U.S. actions and to its attempts to derail the ABM Treaty. The USSR has repeatedly warned the United States that undermining this treaty, including the section concerning the problems of building BMEWS radar stations, could have serious consequences.

Our country is in favor of reinforcing the ABM Treaty system and ensuring that the countries concerned refrain for as long as possible from exercising their right to withdraw from the treaty and do not undertake any action in breach of the restrictions laid down by the treaty.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1502

TASS ON REAGAN 'OFFENSIVE' ON CONGRESSIONAL SALT, TESTING VOTES

LD092020 Moscow TASS in English 2014 GMT 9 May 87

[Text] Washington May 9 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reporting:

The White House launched a new offensive on the Congress of the United States in a bid to prevent the supreme legislative body of the country from passing a series of amendments to bills providing for practical steps to limit nuclear arms.

In his regular radio address to the nation President Reagan expressed "grave concern" of the administration over the proposals on that problem currently discussed in Congress.

These are, above all, the amendments that ban nuclear explosions with yields over one kiloton and the testing of an anti-satellite system against a real target in space, and demand strict observance by the U.S. of the main provisions of SALT-2 with which the current administration demonstratively refused to comply.

President Reagan described those measures that enjoy a broad backing among the democratic majority in Congress as "irresponsible".

The President asserted that the amendments would "threaten our arms reduction negotiations with the Soviets" and "pull the rug out from under" the U.S. delegation to the talks.

However, it follows from the President's own explanations that the White House is primarily concerned over the impact of the amendments under discussion in Congress might have on the Pentagon's plans for building up U.S. military power, not over their possible effect on the process of arms control.

"Now the progress we've made in the last six years rebuilding our defenses is once again being put in jeopardy by the short-sightedness of some in Congress," Ronald Reagan said.

The President emphasized once again that if Congress approved the bill which in his words, "undermines the national defense" of the U.S. he would have no other choice but to veto it.

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CSO: 5200/1478

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

MOSCOW: STEALTH WORK INTENSIFIED--The U.S. militarist circles are continuing to intensify work on the construction of a new "Stealth" bomber for the USAF. This bomber is capable of being invisible to the opponent's radars and radar installations and at the same time of penetrating the densest anti-aircraft defense. [video shows NBC film of unidentified delta-wing aircraft] As one of the participants in the development of the new invisible bomber said, the implementation of this new militarist project will cost an astronomical sum, \$80 billion. [From the "Vremya" newscast] [Text] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 May 87 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1478

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GORBACHEV ON 'ELIMINATING' NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ASIA

Talks With SRV Leader

PM201257 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 May 87 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "In an Atmosphere of Friendship and Complete Mutual Understanding"]

[Excerpts] Moscow--Talks between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Nguyen Van Linh, on an official friendly visit in the Soviet Union, opened in the Kremlin 18 May.

Representing the USSR were Nikolay Ryzhkov, Yegor Ligachev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Nikolay Talyzin, Vladimir Kamentsev and other officials. The Vietnamese delegates included member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Do Muoi, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Nguyen Co Thach, and other Vietnamese comrades.

When the key problems of the world development were discussed, the sides confirmed the resolve of both parties and countries to continue strengthening cooperation with other socialist states, with all progressive and peaceful forces in the effort to consolidate peace and security of peoples, to rid humanity of the threat of nuclear war, to end the arms race on earth and prevent the militarization of space.

Much attention was paid to the discussion of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Mikhail Gorbachev noted that a comprehensive program of the consolidation of peace and security, development of relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation in that vast region, based on a new philosophical and political vision of the problems of war and peace, on admitting and grasping the realities existing in the Asia-Pacific region had been advanced in Vladivostok.

Nguyen Van Linh spoke highly of the Leninist peaceful foreign policy of the CPSU and proclaimed the readiness of socialist Vietnam to continue close interaction with the USSR in the struggle for peace, against the menace of nuclear war, and for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, including Asia. Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok set a good beginning to the present positive change of the political climate in the Asia-Pacific region.

The talks were held in the atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding. A joint Soviet-Vietnamese statement will be adopted on the results of the official friendly visit to the USSR by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Van Linh.

Leaders Attend Dinner

LD191640 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 19 May 87

[Text] In the Great Kremlin Palace today, the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Government gave a dinner in honor of Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee. He is in the USSR on an official, friendly visit.

The Vietnamese comrades accompanying Nguyen Van Linh on his trip attended the dinner with him.

Present on the Soviet side were Comrades M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, A.A. Gromyko, L.N. Zaykov, Ye.K. Ligachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, M.S. Solomentsev, V.M. Chebrikov, E.A. Shevardnadze, P.N. Demichev, V.I. Dolgikh, B.N. Yeltsin, N.N. Slyunkov, N.V. Talyzin, A.P. Biryukova, A.F. Dobrynin, A.I. Lukyanov, V.A. Medvedev, V.P. Nikonov, G.P. Razumovskiy, I.V. Kapitonov, deputy chairmen of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR ministers, chairmen of the USSR State Committees, and other officials.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Nguyen Van Linh exchanged speeches. They were heard with attention and received with applause.

The dinner passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Gorbachev Addresses Dinner

PM201111 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report on speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at a Kremlin dinner for Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam under the general headline: "CPSU-Communist Party of Vietnam: Cooperation in All Areas"]

[Excerpts] Comrades, the Soviet Union does not divide the principles of international policy into European and Asian ones, and proceeds from the premise that in the present, interdependent world, the peoples of all continents share common concerns and hopes. We are for peace and good-neighborliness, trust and mutual understanding, and mutually beneficial exchanges of technology, goods, and cultural values prevailing in the relations between states of the Asia-Pacific region, which is acquiring an ever greater significance in international life. Herein lies the gist of our concept set forth in Vladivostok.

In realistically evaluating the current situation, it is apt to mention both the broad interest in the ideas expressed in Vladivostok and the difficulties that the progress of our initiatives is encountering.

But not all are obviously ready for a joint quest for tackling the issues affecting the interests of countries of the region. But our times command joint work to create an Asian-Pacific security system. Of key significance in this respect is the nuclear problem. We cannot help being concerned about the fact that work is continuing in some Asian countries to create nuclear weapons. The ambition to join the nuclear club, while intensive talks are under way to get rid of such weapons, is an obvious recurrence of obsolete political thinking.

In this regard, I would like to mention also nuclear disarmament in Asia. We are now pursuing an active policy of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. Yet we are not doing so to transfer the nuclear danger to other areas of the world. Our aim is, by starting with Europe, where the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons are stockpiled, to lead things to freeing all continents from nuclear weapons by the year 2000 in accordance with the program announced by us on 15 January 1986, and create on that basis an all-embracing international peace and security system.

We are asked why the Soviet Union agreed in Reykjavik to preserve 100 warheads on Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles on each side. I will answer. This is a certain compromise. The U.S. Administration seeks to leave in Asia the nuclear weapons deployed there against the Soviet Union, and this makes us seek a reply, to keep a balance of forces there. For the United States has massed a powerful nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific region and is replenishing the nuclear arsenals on board its ships and at military bases in foreign territories.

At the same time we have more than once declared our preparedness to resolve the problem of medium-range missiles on a global basis. There would be no obstacles to such a settlement, if the U.S. agreed to eliminate its nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and also to withdraw its aircraft carrier flotilla beyond agreed lines. In so doing, of course, the U.S. would not have medium-range missiles on its territory.

We propose that advance be started now on the routes leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia. An important step in that direction would be, for example, the creation of nuclear-free zones. The Soviet Union is known to have signed appropriate protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga on the creation of such a zone in the South Pacific. We support the proposals of other countries on the creation of zones free from nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. An international conference concerning the Indian Ocean, at which it would be possible to examine and decide the question of declaring that area a zone of peace, would also serve the aims of nuclear disarmament.

In Asia, as in Europe, our methods, our approach to nuclear disarmament are the same. We propose this process be implemented under stringent international control consisting of three components: national means, international verification methods, and on-site inspection.

On the whole this is our perception of untying the Asian nuclear knot. By pursuing this course, the states of that area would really be able to start building a regional security system. The efforts in that direction by the countries of the two continents -- Europe and Asia -- could blend together into a single Eurasian process that would give a powerful impetus to the creation of an all-embracing international security system.

We have recently had quite a number of meetings with the leaders of the states of the region, which made it possible to understand each other's stand better.

The Soviet Union's relations with India have assumed a unique character. The Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World, signed by the two countries in November 1986, expresses, as we are convinced, the interests of the whole world community, is based on common human values.

The recent tour of Asian-Pacific countries by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze has been useful in this respect. We highly appreciate the constructive approach of the DPRK and Mongolia to the solution of international problems and cooperation with them.

Progress towards improvement is noticeable in Soviet-Chinese relations. Along with the development of trade, economic and cultural ties, our views have become closer on a number of topical international issues, though, disputable issues remain. We are for full normalization of relations with the PRC. This would accord with the interests of both peoples, the interests of peace and socialism.

It can be confidently said that quite a good groundwork has already been laid by the efforts to create a new political climate in the region, to create an Asia-Pacific security system. We understand that the resolution of that topical problem necessitates coordinated efforts by all states of the region, hence any positive initiative on that score will find a response from the Soviet Union.

Comrades, allow me in conclusion to wish the Communists and all the working people of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam success in the great and noble cause of turning their homeland into the prosperous socialist state Ho Chi Minh dreamed of seeing.

We are confident that the industrious Vietnamese people guided by their combat vanguard will implement these tasks and further strengthen their homeland's prestige in Southeast Asia and all over the world, will contribute towards strengthening the position of socialism.

We wish health and success to Comrade Nguyen Van Linh and other Vietnamese comrades.

Long live the indestructible Soviet-Vietnamese friendship!

KYODO Report on Speech

OW200127 Tokyo KYODO in English 0118 GMT 20 May 87

[Text] Moscow, May 20 KYODO -- Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said Tuesday the Soviet Union is ready to abolish all intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from its Asian region if the United States withdraws nuclear arms from Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

Gorbachev made the statement at a dinner in Moscow in honor of Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Linh, here on his first visit to the Soviet Union since he took power last December.

Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan at a summit meeting in Iceland last October provisionally agreed to totally abolish INF in Europe and limit to less than 100 the number of INF warheads deployed in the Asian region of the Soviet Union and the United States. But this is the first time that the Soviet leader has proposed conditions for the total withdrawal of INF from its Asian region.

Gorbachev said at the dinner meeting that if the United States totally abolishes its nuclear arms in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines and reduces its aircraft carriers to an agreed amount, there would be no obstacle for the solution to the INF problem, Soviet officials said.

His statement was taken as a response to NATO's call last Friday for total INF abolition in Asia and elsewhere as well as a British statement that Britain will accept the Soviet proposal for total INF abolition if such weapons are to be eradicated worldwide.

Nguyen Van Linh Dinner Speech

PM221311 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report on 19 May Kremlin dinner speech by Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, under the general heading: "CPSU-Communist Party of Vietnam: Cooperation in All Areas"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Comrade M.S. Gorbachev!

The situation in the Asia and Pacific region remains tense. The course of U.S. imperialism and reactionary forces aimed at increasing tension is countered by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's well known Vladivostok speech of 28 July last year and by the Soviet Union's subsequent dynamic and vigorous diplomatic activity aimed at resolving the fundamental task -- gradually, step by step, achieving the creation of a system of international peace and security in the Asia and Pacific region meeting the innermost aspirations of the people of Asia and giving a new boost to the struggle for peaceful coexistence in the region and throughout the world.

Being victims of the most bloody and protracted aggressive wars of the past 40 years, the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia know better than anyone the price of peace and wish for the establishment of relations of friendship and cooperation with all states, primarily with neighboring states. The peoples of the three countries of Indochina are resolutely struggling to defend their independence and sovereignty and to strengthen the close cohesion and all-around cooperation between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. At the same time, the three countries of Indochina are persistently seeking to strengthen peace and stability in Southeast Asia and peace and security in the Asia and Pacific region. [paragraph continues]

Thach Meets Shevardnadze

LD191801 Moscow TASS in English 1741 GMT 19 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS -- A meeting was held today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Nguyen Co Thach, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam. He is staying in the Soviet Union in connection with a friendly visit of Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The conversation centred around problems connected with a further consolidation of cooperation between the two countries in the struggle for ensuring universal peace and international security, for achieving a crucial change for the better in the present-day complicated international situation, for ridding humanity of the menace of a nuclear war.

The Soviet and Vietnamese foreign ministers discussed the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and pointed out that the U.S. and some of its allies tried to disrupt the development of positive processes which were really leading to detente in Asia and the Pacific basin.

The foreign ministers of the USSR and Vietnam reiterated the resolve of their countries to work for the improvement of the political climate and for the settlement of conflicts in that vast region, to move towards a firm establishment of peaceful and good neighbourly relations on the basis of joint efforts of countries. The organization there of broad equitable and mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation would be a step towards the establishment of a new international economic order.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam are going to take most active part in this process and put at its service their economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation would be a step towards the establishment of a new international economic order.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam are going to take most active part in this process and put at its service their economic, scientific and technological potential.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam who are staunch supporters of the idea of turning South-East Asia into a nuclear-weapon-free zone are ready to promote its practical implementation.

The Soviet side voiced its full support for the initiatives taken by the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and for joint constructive proposals of the three countries of Indochina aimed at an early settlement by political means of the situation around Kampuchea.

The Soviet Union believes that the putting into practice of the appeal of socialist Vietnam to the People's Republic of China on holding talks for the purpose of settling the problems existing in their bilateral relations and developing a political dialogue between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN member countries would become a major contribution to the improvement of the situation in South-East Asia.

The foreign ministers expressed profound satisfaction over the results of their exchange of view held in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and unity.

Joint Communiqué

PM221059 PRAVDA in Russian 22 May 87 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Statement"]

[Text] The general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Van Linh stayed in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit from 17 to 22 May 1987 at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Talks were conducted between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and Nguyen Van Linh, taking part in which from the Soviet side were -- Nikolay Ryzhkov, Yegor Ligachev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Nikolay Talyzin, Vladimir Kamentsev, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Dmitriy Kachin and other officials.

And from the Vietnamese side Do Muoi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee, secretary of the CPV Central Committee; Nguyen Co Thach, member of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, minister of foreign affairs of the SRV; Hong Ha, member of the CPV Central Committee, head of the Chancellory of the CPV Central Committee; Hoang Bich Son, member of the CPV Central committee, head of the External Ties Department of the CPV Central Committee; Dan Ngoc Xuan, member of the CPV Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the SRV State Planning Committee; Nguyen Manh Cam, member of the CPV Central Committee, ambassador of the SRV in the USSR; Le Xuan Tung, candidate member of the CPV Central Committee, assistant to the general secretary of the CPV Central Committee.

There was a separate meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Nguyen Van Linh.

The in-depth exchanges of views, held in the atmosphere of traditional friendship and mutual understanding, confirmed the common approaches of the CPSU and the CPV to pressing questions of socialist construction and international politics.

When informing Nguyen Van Linh about the life of the party and the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev noted the crucial nature of the present stage in the development of Soviet society, the depth and consistency of the process of renewal started on the initiative of the CPSU.

Nguyen Van Linh expressed the CPV's and the Vietnamese people's feelings of profound admiration for the services to mankind of the peoples of the Soviet Union and its tremendous contribution during the past 70 years to the struggle for peace and socialism.

The Vietnamese Communists and the entire Vietnamese people are inspired by the profound revolutionary restructuring effected in the USSR in accordance with the course of the 27th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee January 1987 Plenum. It embodies the creative force of Marxism-Leninism and gives the fraternal parties valuable experience which can be used by them with due account for the concrete conditions of their countries.

Nguyen Van Linh spoke about the fulfillment of the decisions adopted by the Sixth CPV Congress, the process of renewal that has started in the country in the sphere of economic management and is directed at an all-round stabilization of the socioeconomic situation, the creation of prerequisites for a gradual expansion of the scale of socialist industrialization and at advancing the country.

Mikhail Gorbachev spoke highly of the creative, realistic course of renewal worked out by the Sixth CPV Congress, confirmed the Soviet Union's support of this course and wished the Vietnamese people a successful fulfillment of the decisions of the congress.

The talks centered on questions of bilateral relations.

The Soviet and Vietnamese peoples treasure the friendship and fruitful interaction between the CPSU and the CPV, the USSR and the SRV which have a long and glorious history. The Soviet-Vietnamese brotherhood has formed under the influence of the ideas of the Great October Socialist Revolution the light of which was brought to Vietnam by the outstanding Communist of the Leninist school Ho Chi Minh and his dedicated associates. Having passed the trial of lengthy revolutionary struggle the fraternal relations of the two peoples are becoming increasingly closer.

Nguyen Van Linh expressed the sincere gratitude of the CPV and the Vietnamese people to the CPSU and the Soviet people for the invariable support of and the big and generous assistance to the SRV in the struggle for national liberation, in the cause of building socialism and defending the homeland. He confirmed that the further strengthening of cohesion and all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union is a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The leaders of the CPSU and the CPV expressed the resolve of their parties to expand cooperation at various levels, make an in-depth study of each other's experience, perfect Soviet-Vietnamese relations on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV, the 10th anniversary of which will be celebrated in 1988, the declaration of 1985, the long-term program of developing economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

The sides specially emphasized the importance at the new stage of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty which accords with the interests of building socialism and communism in the two countries, the cause of peace in Southeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific region, and the whole world.

It was stressed that the growing scale of Soviet-Vietnamese interaction, the new approaches to questions of the socioeconomic development of their respective countries worked out by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 6th CPV Congress persistently demand an increase in the effectiveness of cooperation in the direction of socialist integration, international division of labor, co-production and specialization of production, and more active use of the principles of socialist economic management.

In the coming years Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation will be concentrated on the production and processing of agricultural produce, the output of consumer goods, the development in the SRV of the power industry and transport as well as the machine-building, electronic, chemical and mining industries on the full utilization of the existing production capacities and labor resources. Agreement was reached on the vigorous development of cooperation not only on the interstate level but also on the level of ministries and enterprises.

The sides will search for new highly effective forms and fields of cooperation, in particular will set up joint amalgamations and enterprises, will take the necessary measures to modernize enterprises built with the USSR's technical assistance and ensure their operation to full capacity.

Cooperation in the scientific-technical field will be expanded, first of all to ensure the three major economic programs determined by the Sixth CPV Congress, and also in the training of scientific managerial personnel and skilled workers.

A number of agreements on questions of Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation were signed during the visit.

The sides agreed that the Soviet Union will help Vietnam in working out a long-term economic development program.

The Soviet and the Vietnamese leaders declared for the adoption of a number of additional measures to develop economic ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Far East.

Agreement was reached on the setting up of an intergovernmental Soviet-Vietnamese commission on cultural cooperation, on increasing exchanges between the creative unions of the two countries. The days of Soviet culture in the SRV (1987), devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the days of Vietnamese culture in the USSR (1990), timed to coincide with the 45th anniversary of the proclamation of Vietnam's independence and the centenary of the birth of President Ho Chi Minh, are to become major events.

The sides will continue their interaction in the training and retraining of specialists in the field of culture, the study of the Russian language in Vietnam and the study of the Vietnamese language in the Soviet Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Nguyen Van Linh confirmed the principled line of the CPSU and the CPV of further strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist community, of developing to the maximum the initiative, vigor and creativity of each party and country.

They noted the definitive importance of working meetings held by the top leaders of the fraternal parties for working out agreed-upon directives of the mutual cooperation and the common courses of countries of the socialist community in international affairs.

The participants in the talks declared for further perfecting the mechanism of conferences of Central Committee secretaries of the fraternal parties, for making other forms of the multilateral cooperation of socialist countries more effective.

The USSR and the SRV will further closely interact in the interests of deepening socialist economic integration, fulfilling the comprehensive program of the scientific-technical progress of member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to the year 2000 and perfecting the CMEA's activities.

The Soviet Union will take an active part in drawing up within the CMEA framework a program for helping the national economic development of Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba and in its efficient implementation.

The exchanges of opinions reaffirmed the identity of views held by the CPSU and the CPV on pressing international problems, the determination of the Soviet Union and Vietnam actively to interact to strengthen international peace and general security, and their solidarity with popular struggles for national independence and social progress.

Mikhail Gorbachev spoke about the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state to promote Soviet initiatives for lessening international tension and about the Soviet Union's practical steps to affirm a new mode of political thinking in world affairs and develop relations of goodneighborliness and cooperation in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world. A description was given of the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations and the course of talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva and stress was laid on the fundamental significance of a Soviet proposal for eliminating the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe and embarking on talks without delay for reducing and subsequently eliminating the theatre missiles on station on the European continent.

Nguyen Van Linh reiterated complete support by the CPV and the Vietnamese people for the new and important peace initiatives by the USSR. He said that the Soviet Union, pursuing a Leninist foreign policy, is the principal motive force in efforts for easing tension, fending off the threat of nuclear war, and strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

The leaders of the CPSU and the CPV expressed resolve to do everything to break the dangerous trend in world development, stop the arms race on earth, prevent its extension to outer space, and make sure that the enormous funds now spent on military purposes will be directed instead to solving urgent problems, most notably those in developing countries.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam are firmly committed to the idea of turning the Asia-Pacific region into a region of peace, stability, goodneighborliness and cooperation through joint efforts by all states of the region and an all-round approach to the problems of ensuring its security. The realization of this idea would be facilitated by a just settlement of existing conflicts by political means, the non-buildup and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, a scaling down of naval activities in the Pacific, the implementation of practical measures to establish nuclear-free zones, cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments, and the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust.

Both sides stressed the importance of reducing tension in Southeast Asia as soon as possible. The Soviet Union supports the resourceful policy of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia directed at improving the political climate in Southeast Asia and developing friendly relations with the ASEAN countries and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

The USSR and Vietnam identify with the national reconciliation policy of the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, whose realization would meet the vital interests of the Cambodian people and their right to decide their destiny themselves and help restore peace in the country. The internal problems of Cambodia should be solved by the Cambodian people themselves.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam believe that the search for ways of settling the international aspects of the Cambodian problem by political means should be conducted with regard for realities in the region and with the involvement in this or that form of all sides concerned. The Soviet Union and Vietnam are strongly for giving Cambodia its lawful place in the United Nations and other international organizations.

The Soviet Union invariably supports efforts by the working people of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea to lay the foundations of socialism, protect the independence and national sovereignty of their countries, and strengthen their fraternal alliance and all-round cooperation, which is an important factor for peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The leaders of the CPSU and the CPV stressed the constructive nature of the Afghan Government's policy aimed at achieving national reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and a political settlement of the situation regarding that country and of the Afghan people's efforts to build a sovereign, independent and nonaligned Afghanistan.

The participants in the talks pointed to a desire by their countries to normalize and improve relations with the People's Republic of China, which would be a major positive factor for strengthening stability in Asia and international life in general. They would also greet China's active involvement in the search for ways of solving the complex problems of the Asian Continent. The Soviet side supported Vietnam's initiative for holding Vietnamese-Chinese talks with a view to settling contentious issues as soon as possible.

The conviction was expressed during the talks that improvements in the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be facilitated by the realization of proposals by the Democratic Republic of Korea for resuming dialogue between the North and the South of Korea and creating a nuclear-free zone there.

Solidarity was reaffirmed with a proposal by the Mongolian People's Republic for creating a mechanism to exclude the use of force in relations between states in Asia and the Pacific.

The USSR and Vietnam attach much importance to the Delhi Declaration and the principles recorded there for building a world free from nuclear weapons and violence and think highly of India's contribution to resolving regional and general international problems in the interests of stronger peace and stability on the Asian Continent and throughout the planet.

The Soviet and Vietnamese leaders hailed the active role of the Nonaligned Movement in efforts against imperialism, neocolonialism and racism and for an end to the arms race, for eliminating nuclear weapons and for peace and international security.

During their stay in Moscow Nguyen Van Linh and the persons accompanying him laid wreaths at Vladimir Lenin's mausoleum and at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin wall and visited the Museum "Vladimir Lenin's study and apartment in the Kremlin". Flowers were also placed at the memorial plaque honoring Ho Chi Minh and at the site of a future monument to him.

The Vietnamese leaders had a talk at the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet, visited the exhibition of the economic achievements of the USSR, saw new residential areas in the Soviet capital, attended a rally of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship at the footwear factory Parizhskaya Kommuna and familiarized themselves with the accomplishments of its work collective. A meeting was held with activists of the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship society.

Nguyen Van Linh expressed deep gratitude for the warm and cordial reception accorded him and the persons accompanying him.

The visit by Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee, to the USSR was a striking demonstration of the inviolability of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship. The talks held in Moscow mark an important new step in improving and further developing the entire package of relations between the CPSU and the CPV and between the USSR and the SRV, and in deepening collaboration between the two countries in the international arena in the interests of peace and international security.

On behalf of the CPV Central Committee Nguyen Van Linh conveyed to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, an invitation to pay an official friendly visit to Vietnam. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

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CSO: 5200/1503

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MANILA BACKS GORBACHEV 19 MAY ASIA ARMS PROPOSAL

HK221143 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 22 May 87 pp 1, 6

[By Francisco Cevallos]

[Text] The Philippine Government backed yesterday the proposal of Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the United States remove its military bases from the country, Japan and South Korea in exchange for the abolition of all Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in the Asia region.

Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, who is also the country's foreign affairs secretary, said "the Philippines welcomes any step leading to the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament." In effect, foreign diplomatic observers said Laurel was in favor of the abolition of U.S. bases in the Philippines.

In a prepared statement, Laurel said the Philippines had always joined the International community in calling for general and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal. He added that "we have always supported the UN General Assembly resolutions on the subject.

Laurel's statement was the Philippines' official reaction to the offer made by Gorbachev in Moscow last Tuesday.

He said the Soviet Union was ready to remove all intermediate-range nuclear forces from Asia "if the U.S. pulls out its nuclear arms from its bases in the Philippines, Japan and South Korea" and "reduces its aircraft carriers to an agreed number."

The Soviet leader's statement confirmed in effect the presence of U.S. nuclear arms in the country. The Americans have two big military bases here -- the Subic Naval Base in Zambales and the Clark Air Base in Pampanga.

It has been the U.S. policy not to provide information on whether or not nuclear weapons are stationed in its bases in the Philippines.

Gorbachev spoke at a dinner affair held in honor of Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Linh, who is in Russia on an official visit.

The Soviet leader and President Reagan, at their summit meeting in Iceland last October, provisionally agreed to totally abolish INF in Europe and limit to fewer than 100 the number of INF warheads deployed in the Asian side of the Soviet Union and the United States.

But the international news services said this was the first time Gorbachev had proposed conditions for the total withdrawal of INF from its Asian region.

Last Friday, the NATO countries called for total INF abolition in Asia and elsewhere. A British statement said Britain was ready to accept the Soviet proposal for total INF abolition "if such weapons are to be eradicated worldwide."

Military sources said the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces consist of the Soviet's SS-20 missiles and the US's Cruise and Pershing-2 missiles. These weapons, called Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (LRINF) have a range of 960-4,800 kilometers.

In the Russian side, there are SS-20's -- each capable of carrying 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles) deployed in the Soviet Central Asia. There is no information on the US nuclear forces in the Philippines.

Laurel said, however, "specific arrangements to advance the disarmament process would have to be worked out between the nuclear powers.

"We urge that in such arrangements, the interests of the other countries and the strategic situation in each region be taken into account," he said.

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CSO: 5200/4310

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CALLS INF GROUP 'MOST SUBSTANTIVE' OF NST

LD160014 Moscow TASS in English 2050 GMT 15 May 87

[Text] Geneva May 15 TASS -- Discussions in all groups -- medium-range missiles, outer space, and strategic offensive armaments were intensively under way during the past week at the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space armaments.

Most substantive is the work which is carried out within the group on medium-range missiles, the problem which is the most advanced from the viewpoint of possibilities of attaining a concrete accord before the end of the current year. Two draft treaties, the American and the compromise Soviet, on the table of negotiations have brought the sides close to producing a joint draft treaty on elimination of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and of the United States in Europe in accordance with the formula for solution of this question agreed upon in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1501

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW NEWS CITES SOVIET, U.S. NEGOTIATORS ON PROGRESS OF TALKS

PM201329 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 20, 17 May 87 p 5

[Spartak Beglov Article: "Geneva -- Moment of Reckoning. How Talks on Medium-Range Missiles Are Progressing"]

[Text] "We are beginning to liquidate nuclear weapons and this is the essence of what is happening at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva," said Yuliy Vorontsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, head of the Soviet delegation at the talks, in a talk with us, a group of Soviet journalists. "In the last 42 years a stereotyped form of thinking has been artificially moulded, according to which the A-bomb is the main bulwark of security. Very many people started clutching to this unnatural situation and at these weapons as if life were impossible without them. Whereas in real life we must fear precisely the fact that people can grow reconciled to the A-bomb as something inevitable, because the A-bomb is a tool for mankind's suicide. That's why we think that the radical shift in the question of medium-range missiles is a very important beginning, and we'll spare no effort for signing a relevant agreement."

Arriving in Geneva, I learned from the old-timers that the number of foreign correspondents in the city has grown by at least 50 percent in the last two years. But, then, that's as it should be. Moscow's latest initiatives resulted in the Soviet-U.S. dialogue on disarmament acquiring a new content and the achievement of the first ever agreement on the liquidation of a whole class of nuclear weapons becoming feasible. Practically, every day of the week on the junction of April and May brought some significant event. On April 27 the Soviet delegation put forward the draft agreement on the liquidation of medium-range missiles [MRM]. On May 4 accord was reached at the parallel Soviet-U.S. talks (they were conducted, on the Soviet side, by A. Obukhov, ambassador at large, and on the U.S. side -- by R. Perle, assistant secretary of defense, and R. Linhard, special assistant to the President) on setting up centres on reducing the nuclear danger in Moscow and Washington.

Lastly, the latest (the 8th) round of talks on nuclear and space arms, started on May 5. The Soviet side proposed to agree upon the key provisions of accords on a number of major disarmament problems, including cuts of strategic attack arsenals and strengthening of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Missile Defence (ABM).

Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation, deemed it necessary at his very first meeting with journalists upon arriving in Geneva, to stress the big impulse provided for the talks by the results of the conversation G. Shultz had with the Soviet leadership. He singled out the question on the medium-range missiles and said that the group elaborating the agreement on the liquidation of these missiles would now be able to work on a "stepped-up schedule."

A. Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet delegation, stressed, on his part, that all the prerequisites were here for the Treaty on the MRM to be translated into reality already this year. He said that in its proposals the Soviet side has taken into account everything constructive that, in its opinion, was contained in the previously tabled U.S. proposals. This includes - stage-by-stage reduction of arms; a common attitude toward defining the weapons to be reduced; the taking into account of both deployed and not deployed weapons; the abidance by the Reykjavik formula on the liquidation in the course of five years of all the MRMs in Europe, with the preservation of only 100 warheads, on each side, on such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory.

However, the U.S. standstill has moments with which the Soviet side cannot agree. For example, the procedure, offered by the U.S. side, envisages that only the Soviet missiles would be liquidated at the first two stages, whereas the U.S. side would even have the opportunity of even building up its MRM arsenals. "Our principle is - no one is to get unilateral advantages, and the participation in the reduction should be mutual." The U.S. side's intention to re-equip the Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range missiles and to get an opportunity to transfer the cruise missiles from land bases to the sea is also unacceptable. The same goes for the intention to deploy the remaining 100 warheads in Alaska, i.e., within the range of the USSR territory. The Soviet diplomat said that this would lead only to the emergence of one more source of danger in that area of the globe.

I asked Maynard Glitman, a U.S. diplomat, who leads the U.S. group at the talks on MRM: "How well is the line taken by the U.S. delegation at these talks agreed upon with the stand taken by the U.S. NATO allies on these questions?" In answer I heard that the U.S. side intends to conduct talks, but, at the same time, to keep an eye on how the U.S. allies would react ultimately to the Soviet proposals.

In the meanwhile, H. Kohl, FRG Chancellor, and J. Chirac, French Prime Minister, met in Strasbourg, early in May, and declared that their ultimate joint stand could be determined only as the result of a study of the text of the Soviet proposals. But, as the head of the French Government declared, the allies had no complete Soviet text at this disposal.

I drew A. Obukhov's attention to this declaration. "The Soviet side treats with understanding the fact that the West's representatives need some time to discuss and size up our proposals," he said. "However, the problem, which, supposedly, arose of being unable to get to know the text of the Soviet proposals, is obviously far-fetched. The U.S. representatives regularly visit the NATO HQ and keep their allies informed of everything that is going on in Geneva.

"However much of a paradox it may seem, it is precisely those NATO politicians who had been rooting for the 'zero option' literally yesterday on medium-range missiles, who are very much alarmed today when a breakthrough to this decision has been really made."

That is why the West put up the question on battlefield-operational weapons, with an obvious calculation of offering a pretext to the U.S. side for getting these weapons. This is exactly what some U.S. allies have in mind when they start speaking of the Americans' "right to equality". And Washington seeks additional opportunities for drawing its allies to work on the SDI. But Yuliy Vorontsov stressed: "Our stand on medium-range and battlefield-tactical missiles in Europe is no rearming. If we're to have parity, then only on the zero level." This means no transforming of Pershing-2 into Pershing-1B missiles. In the context of the decisions on shorter-range missiles there must be no room in Europe for U.S. nuclear warheads to equip the West German Pershing-1A missiles.

He goes on to say: "Can we expect that the agreement on medium-range missiles, if it is signed, will have a favourable effect also on the settlement of other questions of nuclear disarmament, in particular, on the reduction of strategic attack arms? Yes, the liquidation of medium-range missiles provides a good stimulus for reduction of strategic arms and is an important component of the entire Soviet programme for the stage-by-stage liquidation of nuclear arms by 2000. The process of dismantling and liquidation of medium-range missiles provides good know-how in dealing with the entire package of questions of nuclear disarmament. Let's take, for example, the problem of elaboration of verification measures. I think, that in our proposals on their questions we go even further than the Americans do. In particular, this is true in the field of control over the enterprises which make medium-range missiles. According to the U.S. proposals, the inspectors get only as far as the entrance to the enterprises. But we propose that they be given access to the enterprises themselves.

"We'd like to see how the missiles are being liquidated, how they are being dismantled - all this under the eyes of the Americans and us. This would be a good beginning for the liquidation of all nuclear weapons."

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CSO, 5200/1501

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA VIEWS DEBATES IN FRANCE, FRG, ITALY, UK, U.S.

PM201311 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 May 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" column by Pavel Demchenko]

[Excerpts] Surmounting Obstacles

There was a major event this week in Soviet-French relations, whose development has of late been far from smooth: French Prime Minister J. Chirac visited Moscow. There were important meetings and talks here, which demonstrated that our relations need a considerable fillip for their former friendly character to be fully revived.

As is known, the USSR and France are traditionally linked by vigorous trade, cultural, and scientific exchange and there are many other points of contact in matters of broad international and regional politics. I will mention, for example, the fact that France favors observance of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty in its entirety, is opposed to the spread of the arms race to space, and favors the continuation and development of the Helsinki process in Europe. Here our countries' positions essentially coincide.

But for some time dark clouds have been obscuring the Soviet-French sky. Outbreaks of anti-Sovietism, suspicion, and negativism toward our country have come into blatant conflict with the policy and proposals issuing from Moscow. This is particularly marked in the fundamental issue of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. The French Government has stated that it intends to back so-called "nuclear deterrence," to improve and increase its nuclear potential, and to produce chemical weapons. Contrary to sane logic, there have been continual noises from Paris giving assurances that in our era nuclear weapons all but "guarantee peace and security in the world" and one must pay homage to them for the fact that there have been no wars in Europe for more than 40 years.

It seems to me that what we have here is not just France's own position, but also an indication of how difficult it is to clear a path for the Soviet peace initiatives currently enjoying the support of millions all over the world. Here are the facts of recent days. Judging by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl's statement, his government has made a decision on the Soviet proposal on eliminating medium-range nuclear missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. There is still disagreement in Bonn over the elimination of these classes of nuclear armaments.

At the same time Italian Defense Minister R. Gaspari believes that the "prospects for turning Europe into a zone free from nuclear weapons, by implementing a single, double,

or triple zero option, as they say these days, are now a reality and we all want them to arrive as soon as possible."

There is fierce antagonism in the United States between the supporters and opponents of space militarization and other military programs.

Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has just promulgated a plan prepared by the Pentagon for experiments within the framework of SDI in the next few years. While that was going on, the U.S. House of Representatives, which is discussing the military expenditure bill, voted for an effective freeze on SDI expenditure at this year's level, fixing a sum of \$3.1 billion instead of the \$5.7 billion the administration asked for. During the debate Representative Barbara Boxer said that the discontinuation of the SDI program would "make it possible to prevent an endless new arms race spiral and the spread of it to space." "Such an arms race," she continued, "would be much more dangerous and deadly than even the current one."

Bold words, how true! They accord with the demands of many people on both sides of the Atlantic not to allow an arms race in space and to stop it on earth. Dynamic, vigorous efforts are needed to achieve advances in this sphere. Certain agreements, given a favorable combination of circumstances and goodwill on the West's part, appear to me to be possible in the foreseeable future. But let us not anticipate events: There are still many difficulties and obstacles in the way.

One Year Early [subhead]

Journalists were predicting the possibility of this event some months ago. Now it has happened. Namely, that a new general election has been called for 11 June in Britain, 1 year before the government's term expires. It was officially announced by Prime Minister M. Thatcher.

The preelection debate is bound to touch on the defense policy of the Tories, who are continuing to champion the nuclear "deterrent force," whereas Labor has the opposite view.

But now the government, although not without reservations, has made it known that in principle it regards the "double zero option" as acceptable, that is, the simultaneous elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe in accordance with the Soviet proposal. The press called the London announcement sensational, asserting that it had been made with the mood of the electorate in mind. In fact, it seems to me that it is a step in the right direction from the viewpoint of easing tension in Europe.

For all that, London's FINANCIAL TIMES believes that the Conservative leadership cannot see the forthcoming election as a "lottery they cannot lose." Substantial sections of the British electorate are still obviously undecided and any unexpected factor in the election campaign could change the political balance in the country.

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CSO: 5200/1501

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET MEDIA ASSAILS NATO DISCUSSIONS ON INF

NATO Council Meeting

LD082121 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 8 May 87

[Text] A week of action for security and cooperation in Europe begins today. Political observer Aleksander Zholkver comments:

At our meetings of veterans of the last war, the thought repeated most frequently is that our children must never have to know the flames of war. The best way to make this wish come true is by the active participation of each of us in the struggle for peace, whether in our own jobs or among those who get together for antiwar protest demonstrations. Particularly favorable opportunities have now arisen for undertaking effective measures to make our common European home more comfortable and secure.

It is possible to scrap the entire class of most dangerous armaments in Europe. The way toward this has been opened up by our proposals to eliminate all nuclear missiles on the European Continent. These proposals are being actively supported by the socialist states of Europe. They have been approved by the West European socialist and social democratic parties, whose congress was held recently in Portugal. The participants of the spring peace marches -- which numbered a great many people in many countries of Western Europe -- spoke out in support of our initiatives.

What are the governments of these countries engaged in at present? So far they have been discussing, meeting and consulting. It has been officially announced that the NATO Council meeting just held in Brussels was part of these consultations. It goes without saying that the matter of eliminating Euromissiles is an important problem, and everything should be weighed up and thought over. Yet is this thinking process not being dragged out for far too long. And in which direction is it developing? In Bonn, for example, Chancellor Kohl's government statement of yesterday was very ambiguous. Medium-range missiles may be, as it were, scrapped, whereas short-range missiles should be retained. In Paris and London they simply advocate the idea of retaining the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

However, times are changing: Even THE WASHINGTON POST states that NATO strategy needs changing: The main thing however, is that in Europe -- the NATO countries included -- political thinking is changing. Even conservative politicians are beginning to realize the absence of prospects in and the danger of a policy which relies only on strength in our nuclear missile age. Meanwhile, restructuring in our country is destroying the myth of the Soviet threat which has been studiously spread by Western propaganda. So I think there is good reason to suppose that this year the week of action for security and cooperation in Europe will be particularly effective.

NATO 'In No Hurry' To Respond

LD112002 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 11 May 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Excerpt]

What is the Atlantic bloc's response to all our initiatives, though? For the moment, endless conferences and consultations are being held there. At the end of this week, the Nuclear Planning Group is to meet in the Norwegian town of Stavanger. In another week, a session of the NATO Military Planning Committee at the level of defense ministers and chiefs of general staffs is to be held in Brussels. And only somewhere around the middle of June do the NATO foreign ministers intend to gather in Reykjavik in order to finally state their attitudes to the Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament, at a special session of the Atlantic bloc Council. Such is the schedule, more or less, which has been officially announced from NATO headquarters. As you can see, they are in no hurry.

Nuclear Planning Group Meets

LD141119 Moscow TASS in English 1110 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Oslo May 14 TASS -- A two-day session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group opened in the Norwegian city of Stavanager today. Attending are defense ministers of 14 countries of the North Atlantic alliance, except France and Iceland which are not integrated into the NATO military structure.

On the agenda of the session is the issue of West's stance in view of the Soviet proposals for eliminating intermediate and shorter-range missiles from Europe. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is to set out the U.S. stand to the ministers today.

Shows 'Duplicity'

OW160919 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0315 GMT 15 May 87

[Commentary by Sergey Alekseyev; from the 'Novosti' newscast]

[Text] The scheduled session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has opened in Stavanger, Norway. Our commentary:

[Alekseyev] Hello, comrades. The declared aim of the session which has just opened can only be applauded -- to give an answer to the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles and tactical missiles in Europe. Although a month has elapsed since U.S. Secretary of State Shultz was informed in Moscow of the new Soviet initiatives directed above all at the NATO bloc, it has yet to officially reply.

Admittedly, NATO Secretary General Carrington has said that prospects for reaching an INF agreement have improved. But at the same time, in an interview with THE TIMES, he

categorically spoke out against the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. It is precisely the nuclear weapons -- and I am quoting now -- that are contributing to the prevention of war. The U.S. General Rogers, commander in chief of NATO forces in Europe, said something similar at the end of April. He too, prior to this, approved the Soviet-U.S. meetings in Moscow for their possibilities of reaching agreement on INF. The same can be said about military leaders in the FRG and France. In some interviews they speak in favor of an agreement on eliminating missiles in Europe, but in other interviews they come forth with new excuses to ensure that this agreement is not reached.

Such duplicity, contradictions, and poor judgment in the first reaction of NATO leaders to the Soviet peace proposals are explained by many Western observers in terms of their confusion and shock caused by these initiatives. But how long can this condition last? A time has come to give a definite and clear answer to the proposals of the Soviet Union and to clear our common European house from the death-bearing nuclear burden. Although there are signs that opinion will be divided in Norway, I do not wish to make pessimistic forecasts; hope for the best. The NATO nuclear planning group session will conclude tomorrow, so let us wait.

Fails To Reach Agreement

LD151458 Moscow TASS in English 1445 GMT 15 May 87

[Text] Oslo May 15 TASS -- The two-day session of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group at defence ministers' level ended in the Norwegian city of Stavanger today.

The discussion of the initiatives proposed by the Soviet Union to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe occupied the central place on the agenda.

Judging by a communique issued at the close of the session, the ministers failed to work out a unified position with regard to shorter-range missiles.

As far as medium-range missiles are concerned, the defence ministers demanded that the Soviet-U.S. understanding reached at summit level in Reykjavik be changed in the part specifying that the Soviet Union and the United States would each keep 100 nuclear warheads on the missiles of this class outside Europe.

According to press reports, the discussion of the question of the North Atlantic alliance's stand on nuclear missiles will be continued at a session of the NATO council at foreign ministers' level. The session will be held in Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland, on June 11-12.

'Secret Plan To Cheat'

LD171838 Moscow TASS in English 1756 GMT 17 May 87

[Text] London, 17 May (TASS)--The United States and NATO are making secret plans which, in their opinion, may heap them circumvent an agreement with the Soviet Union on the abolition of medium-range missiles in Europe and build up nuclear arsenals on that continent even further.

The British newspaper NEWS ON SUNDAY reported that the NATO command in cooperation with the Pentagon had devised a secret plan to cheat the Soviet Union.

According to the paper, it is planned not to destroy the medium-range nuclear systems deployed in Britain, but only to take them off the back of lorries from which they are launched and load on to planes and submarines.

Moreover, NATO General intend to reclassify these missiles as "strategic". [sentence as received] As a result, they will not be covered by the proposed treaty with Soviet Union.

In the words of the newspaper, the plan would mean removing all 96 cruise missiles based at the Greenham Common base in Berkshire and abandoning plans for a further 64 such missiles at the Molesworth facility in Cambridgeshire.

But at least 230 cruise missiles would be fitted to U.S. bombers at the U.S. Air Force base in Fairford, Gloucester, and another 108 would be fitted to submarines based at Holy Loch in Scotland.

As a result the number of cruise missiles in Britain may treble if that program is carried through, the newspaper said.

Efforts To 'Complicate' Talks

LD181938 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 18 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 18 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

NATO countries assiduously demonstrate the "lack of unity" about the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles from Europe and are clearly in no hurry to give an intelligible answer to these proposals. On the other hand, the United States allies in Europe with surprising promptness reach accord on the need for nuclear arming of the North Atlantic alliance under the pretext of "compensation" for a possible elimination of U.S. nuclear missiles from Europe.

One gets the impression that the stream of contradictory "amendments" to the Soviet plan now coming from capitals of the European NATO countries is aimed at finding loopholes which could first complicate the process of reaching agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles and later, possibly, bury the prospects of reduction of nuclear arms in Europe.

FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl has of late been manifesting special zeal in placing obstacles in the road of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on nuclear missiles in Europe. The head of the West German Government all of a sudden came out with a "radical" proposal to take into account at the talks in Geneva nuclear weapons of any range from zero to 1,000 kilometres. And then the West German leader suggested taking into account at the talks on medium-range missiles both chemical weapons and conventional forces in Europe.

Making conjectures about the reasons that prompted the FRG chancellor to come out with his "initiative", most Western observers arrive at the conclusion that it will complicate the talks in Geneva and will throw into turmoil the process of reaching agreement. The conservative Danish newspaper "BERLINGSKE TIDENDE," commenting on

Kohl's statement, points out: "He who acts on the 'all or nothing' principle does not get and, probably, does not want to get anything."

It is characteristic that the proposal advanced in Bonn for involving weapons with a range less than 500 kilometres in the talks met with approval of precisely those circles which insist on the need to "prevent turning Europe into a nuclear-free zone." For instance, leader of the Christian Social Union Franz-Josef Strauss is the one who declares most zealously in support of that initiative in the FRG. He cited truly fantastic figures about the ratio of short-range missiles of the USSR and NATO.

An analogy suggests itself between the recent statement of the Pentagon's chief Casper Weinberger at a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Stavanger on the revision of the Soviet-U.S. arrangements reached in Reykjavik and Kohl's proposals on short-range missiles. On the face of it, both proposals were about "expanding" measures for nuclear arms limitation and reduction. Both political figures hold similar, and far from constructive, stands on questions of relations with socialist countries. Weinberger's attitude to the very idea of disarmament is well-known and needs no comment. As to Kohl, Federal Secretary of the SPD [Socialist Democratic Party] Anke Fuchs recently noted that deep down in his heart he is a proponent of the cold war, who rejects the double zero option on nuclear missiles.

It is quite probable that Washington, deciding to cripple the prospects for reaching agreement on nuclear missiles in Europe, chose this time, too, for the implementation of this task the most "loyal Atlanticist" in European NATO countries.

'Tactics of Procrastination and Obstruction'

PM201520 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Vikentiy Matveyev article under the rubric "Apt Remarks": "The Atlantic Refrigerator"]

[Text] Streams of frosty air are being wafted into the political atmosphere on the European Continent from NATO headquarters. That is how the line of the bloc's leading organs with regard to the problem of ridding the continent of nuclear weapons should be defined. This problem is the subject of wide debate today in Western Europe as a realistic, practical task whose implementation will, of course, require major, joint steps by all interested governments.

The new Soviet foreign policy initiatives, in the opinion both of influential political circles in the West and of broad strata of the public, pave the way forward along this major highway. They accord fully with what was discussed at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. The removal from Europe of all the medium-range missiles of the United States and the USSR, according to recent official statements, is seen in Washington as something that is desirable and feasible without long delays. On our side, readiness has been expressed to take into account the legitimate wishes of governments in Western Europe also with regard to an accord on the categories of shorter-range missile weapons.

But time is passing. In the NATO leading organs, where, it is reported, a coordinated response to the Soviet proposals is to be formulated, they continue to follow what can only be described as tactics of procrastination and obstruction.

Thus U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has just called on Western governments "not to be in a hurry to discuss these problems and all that they involve."

The Pentagon chief took part in the session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which ended on 15 May in Stavanger, Norway. After the meeting a U.S. journalist asked him a very revealing question: To what extent was the group's final communique the result of his "ability to persuade the partners?" The journalist put it tactfully, but the thought is clear. Indeed, this document bears the clear imprint of "influence" on its compilers by the Pentagon chief.

It says in black and white that NATO "will preserve and improve its nuclear forces." Unsubstantiated claims are made that the other side (the USSR) has supposedly proposed "vague commitments in regard to monitoring," although the document's authors must know very well what detailed, strict propositions were put forward by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks on the question of verifying the observance of the accord under consideration.

Finally, mention should be made of the tactic of "maximizing" the versions of a possible Soviet-U.S. agreement by including in it a wide spectrum of systems within the military arsenals. In practice it is a question of hampering the accord that had really begun to take shape, by overloading the agenda for talks. The influential Danish newspaper BERLINGSKE TIDENDE observed rightly: Anyone who operates according to the principle "all or nothing" achieves nothing, and probably does not want to achieve anything, either." [quotation marks as published]

It is not surprising that it is within the NATO framework that an attempt has been made to erect barriers in the path of the accord expected both by broad strata of the public and by governments in Western Europe.

Suffice it to point out that in official circles in London, Brussels, Rome, Madrid, and Lisbon some degree of support was expressed for efforts to lower the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe.

It was Weinberger, again, who stated in an interview after the NATO group's meeting in Stavanger that the bloc should preserve the potential for a nuclear strike. As always, he referred to the "Soviet threat." Such claims have never sounded more hollow than they do now. Everyone can see who is holding onto the weapons of mass destruction, regarding them not as an evil, but a "good." Everyone can see who is opposed to any steps aimed at curbing the race for such weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1501

PRAVDA REPORTS ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENTS ON INF

White Paper on Defense Policy

PM131419 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 87 Second Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Arkadiy Maslenniko: "Nuclear Chains"]

[Text] London -- The British Government has published in London its "white paper" on defense issues, which sets out the main aspects of its policy in the years to come.

Presenting this document to journalists, Secretary of State for Defense G. Younger laid particular emphasis on the fact that the Thatcher cabinet does not intend to make any substantial changes to its concept of relying on nuclear arms. The government, the "white paper" states, remains loyal to its commitments to maintain a strong defense -- both nuclear and conventional -- while striving at the same time to improve dialogue with the Soviet Union.

It must be said that in the situation now taking shape, those who are responsible for the formulation of British foreign policy are finding it difficult to reconcile the militarist thinking traditionally characteristic of ruling Conservative circles with the new, constructive trends in international relations, which have arisen recently as a result of the USSR's peace initiatives. Prime Minister M. Thatcher's recent visit to the Soviet Union, the warm reception given to her by Soviet people, and the meetings and talks held in Moscow have considerably worn down the mythical image of the "uncompromising enemy," which is how the Soviet Union has been depicted for decades by reactionary propaganda here [in London]. In these conditions it is far more difficult for the authors of this "white paper" to validate the need to increase military expenditure and prove the expediency of the expensive program to modernize "nuclear means of deterrence," the absence of which would supposedly leave Britain and the whole of Western Europe "defenseless" in the face of "Soviet expansionism" and the USSR's alleged "willingness to use its military might to achieve its political aims."

Nevertheless, they are doing precisely this. According to the preliminary outline contained in the "white paper," British military expenditure in the forthcoming 1987-1988 fiscal year is to reach 18,782 million pounds sterling, which is more than double the military budget 8 years ago when the Conservative government led by Thatcher first came into power. But even this is not the limit. By 1989 total military expenditure is to come close to 20 billion pounds sterling, after which, according to the authors of this "white paper," the country's defense budget will "level out to a certain extent."

Whitehall says that it welcomes the new thinking on the agenda of international politics by the Soviet leadership and that it is prepared to develop constructive relations with the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that these words would sound more convincing if its proposed defense measures were to be oriented toward detente rather than a buildup of the destructive arsenals envisaged in Britain's new military programs.

Foreign Office Spokesman

PM201517 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "London's Position"]

[Text] London, 15 May -- A spokesman for the British Foreign Office in London has said that the British Government may agree to the double zero option regarding medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles on condition that the corresponding guarantees of Western security are ensured. Consultations on this subject are now in progress in NATO with the aim of reaching a definitive decision on the stand to be taken, the Foreign Office spokesman said. He also said that the British Government is making every effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement.

THE FINANCIAL TIMES notes that this is the first time Britain has made it clearly understood that it is prepared in principle to approve the Soviet proposal -- the double zero option, which envisages removing nuclear missiles from Europe. This statement by the British Foreign Office has put an end to the rumors that have been circulating for several weeks regarding Britain's attitude to the USSR proposals.

The press reports that the discussion of the stand to be taken by the North Atlantic alliance regarding medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles will be continued at the NATO Council session in Reykjavik on 11-12 June.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CRITICIZES FRG'S 'STUBBORN' STANCE ON USSR PROPOSALS

LD150953 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0031 GMT 15 May 87

[Excerpt] Bonn, 15 May (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov reports:

Official Bonn is not interested in any radical steps to reduce nuclear missile weapons in Europe and is trying by means of various sorts of subterfuges and tricks to delay the resolving of a problem which is vitally important for mankind, the problem of eliminating nuclear missiles on the continent. This conclusion can be drawn from the statement made by an official representative of the FRG Government at a press conference here on Thursday.

The essence of the statement comes down virtually to saying that Bonn intends, he says, to continue "to study carefully and in detail" the Soviet proposal for a "zero option" on operational and tactical missiles in Europe. At the same time, it is indicative that the representative, while uttering many words about peace and disarmament, did not reply to the question about when the West German Government intended to complete this manifestly protracted "study." He restricted himself only to diffuse assurances that Bonn would "continue intensive contacts" with its allies on this problem.

The stubborn unwillingness of the ruling coalition to give a concrete and constructive reply to the USSR's proposal is meeting with sharp criticism, primarily from the FRG's parliamentary opposition.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: GDR'S HONECKER SUPPORTS USSR PROPOSALS

LD182203 Moscow TASS in English 1854 GMT 18 May 87

[Text] Berlin May 18 TASS -- The GDR supports the Soviet Union's new disarmament proposals which indicate the way to a world free from nuclear weapons, said Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, chairman of the State Council of the GDR. He received here today Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand Sitthi Sawetsila now on an official visit to the GDR.

An agreement on elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe would be the first important step towards elimination of all systems of mass destruction. The GDR expects the United States and West European states to display a constructive approach and meet these proposals half way, he stressed.

The German Democratic Republic is naturally interested in prompt results. The GDR's proposals for establishing in Central Europe a zone free from chemical weapons, and a corridor free from nuclear weapons are also aimed at strengthening international security and building up confidence.

The GDR leader said that there were no international problems that cannot be settled through negotiations. He expressed the hope that the contacts between the socialist states of Indochina and the ASEAN member-states would be successfully developing and exert a positive impact on peace and detente in Southeast Asia.

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CSO: 5200/1501

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA: URUGUAYAN SENATOR ENDORSES SOVIET INITIATIVES

PM141559 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Interview With Uruguayan Senator"]

[Text] Montevideo, 11 May--Uruguayan Senator Americo Ricaldoni [name as published], chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has expressed complete support for the statement by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the need for responsibility and realism in solving present-day international problems--a statement which he made in his talk with Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda during his recent official visit to the USSR. This approach, the Uruguayan senator stated in an interview with a TASS correspondent, plays a decisive role in ensuring the peaceful coexistence of states. Without it complications and confrontation arise in the international situation and relations among states deteriorate.

Answering a question about attitudes to the program put forward by the Soviet Union for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000, A. Ricaldoni [name as published] noted that Uruguayans have always supported and will always support proposals aimed at reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons. Uruguay, he said, is following with enormous attention the Soviet-U.S. talks on these problems, and hopes that they will end successfully.

Noting the existence of extensive opportunities for developing mutually advantageous relations between Uruguay and the USSR, A. Ricaldoni [name as published] pointed out, however, that these ties should not be measured merely by a positive or negative balance of trade. International relations, he stressed, also encompass cooperation in the sphere of culture, science, technology, and all types of contacts that make it possible not only to know but to understand each other better.

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CSO: 5200/1501

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALIAN SOCIALIST JOURNAL CLAIMS ZERO OPTION WEAKENS EUROPE

Rome MONDOPERAIO in Italian Apr 87 pp 21-24

[Article by Luciano Vasconi: "If Europe Counts Zero"]

[Text] Without Euromissiles, Europe remains exposed and without a credible defense. Gorbachev knows this, that is why he changed his proposals. The zero option makes sense for us only if a U.S. space shield including Europe comes into being. Japan in Asia is operating with this objective. Delors' alarm.

At the Reykjavik summit (11-12 October), Gorbachev involuntarily did Europe a favor by rejecting an agreement on the Euromissiles separate from one on the American space shield: by saying "all or nothing," he avoided, in face of a Reagan with clear ideas about the strategic interests of the United States but much less clear about those of Europe, depriving our continent of an effective defense system. Then, as was natural he should, Gorbachev reconsidered, and now the zero option proposal is on the table, with an America tempted to accept it, also because it had made the first proposal, when it was hoped that the Soviet would not take advantage of it. This paradox confirms how dilettantist has been the West's approach to the negotiation: an idea was put forward that was intended to be only propagandistic, and now it finds itself caught in the trap set by its own hands. This was pointed out by Brzezinski, Carter's former adviser: the zero option "made sense when the effort was being made to prevent stationing of the Soviet SS-20 missiles before the United States could position its own intermediate missiles in Europe. However, once the stationing had occurred, the zero option offers more political and military benefits to the Soviet Union than to the United States. From the military aspect, Moscow obtains invulnerability from such rapid counterforce systems (such as Pershing-2), while at the same time maintaining its capability for attacks on the command centers and even some strategic bases of the United States. On the political level, the zero option threatens to produce a wave of anxiety in Europe over the possible strategic 'decoupling' of the United States and Western Europe." (The interview with Brzezinski was published by the LOS ANGELES TIMES, and republished by CORRIERE DELLA SERA on 12 March).

Even more specific, and dramatic, was the comment by Delors, president of the European Economic Community: Europe will emerge from the Russian-American negotiation with broken bones if it does not understand that it is risking its

own security more than that of the United States; hence Delors' proposal for a special and urgent summit of the EEC devoted to defense, in order to agree on "not only a political response to Gorbachev, but the bases for a common security strategy. This is a historic opportunity for the Community (...), there are moments when analyses are not enough, but action is called for." (Delors' statements were reported by LA STAMPA of 17 March in a dispatch from Paris by Barbara Spinelli.)

Unfortunately, the Delors proposal, as of the time I am writing before closing this issue of MONDOPERAIO, has not produced a reaction commensurate with its seriousness. This reaction has ranged from irresponsible statements, treating Delors as a private citizen speaking in his personal behalf (which demonstrates the real status of the European Community), to utterances that are vigorous but without practical significance as part of the celebration on 25 March of the first 30 years since the Rome Treaties establishing the EEC.

When I wrote from the Reykjavik summit (MONDOPERAIO No 11/1986, "Summit: Gorbachev's Illusions"), I referred to the zero option, the space shield, and the usefulness of the connection between the two levels of issues. I said, if the Soviets now discover that they can do without the missiles aimed at Western Europe during full detente, that confirms that these missiles did not serve for their defence but only to threaten us, to place us in a status of strategic inferiority, toward a "Finlandization" of the continent; if they have now changed their mind, it is because they understand that not only was it right for us to regain (relative) strategic parity, but because in this way we "directly involved" America in our defense, because the missiles that can respond to the threat of the SS-20's are American. This is our strength, our prerequisite for security. To give up the Euromissiles, just at the time when America is pursuing the objective of the space shield, which could protect it (relatively) from the threat of the Soviet intercontinental missiles, would mean encouraging the tendencies, already present, toward an American neo-isolationism, which the weakness of President Reagan feeds, with the suggestions, increasingly evident, that they should not get involved in what is happening, or could happen, beyond their door (from Nicaragua to Europe). The day that the Reagan dream of the space shield materialized--even limited to only a reprisal capability, and not linked to the mythical security of nuclear immunity--a Western Europe without missile protection would be consigned to Soviet discretion, and Gorbachev's reformist goals would not suffice to guarantee it in such a situation, because a Russia that is stronger because more efficient would also be a more direct and insidious danger to our security and our independence. Thus, our objective should not be a denuclearization of Europe--given our abysmal inferiority in conventional weapons--, even more a one-sided denuclearization by us, but should be, if anything, our participation in the American space shield, to try to be an integral part of it; "only at that point will a zero option become useful on the offense side in exchange for coverage of the space shield on the defense side" [quoted passage printed in italics].

This, for example, is the strategy of Japan. Our Landolfi wrote about this (Antonio Landolfi, "The Far East Turning Point," MONDOPERAIO No 12/1986), and Aldo Rizzo concluded his very recent book with this realistic perspective (Aldo Rizzo, "War and Peace in the 20th Century," Laterza, Bari 1987, first edition: January). Tokyo aphoristically declined atomic weapons, also, and

above all, because it was victim of them; it even declined a national defense, because that (and the same goes for Germany) was imposed on them by the conquering powers. But now, as it is regaining a military role in the framework of the bilateral alliance with America (Germany did this within the NATO framework), it is involving itself in an aggressive way in the American space shield project with the resources of its own high technology. As Rizzo writes, it has "jumped over" the nuclear phase, to plunge into the "post-nuclear," and here it has succeeded in evaluating the whole revolutionary scope, both on the military level and the level of technological fallout for civilian purposes, of the American project. And it is doing so not by putting itself in tow of U.S. industry, but even by anticipating it in the field of scientific research, experimentation, and computer miniaturization. It is doing what Western Europe could also do, and instead neglects to do, lining up with America, when it is not pursuing confused projects, neither fish nor fowl, such as the Eureka project. Once again it was Delors who underlined this aspect, and Rizzo quotes him: "If Europe shows up in the technology competition in open-rank formation, it will be limited to offering a technological show window for the American appetite: the latter will choose, share out, and in return will make it difficult for us to gain access to the products generated by the European research."

All this will not happen with a Soviet Union firm in calling for the United States to give up the space shield. As Rizzo fully documents, the Soviets have been working for years, since Khrushchev's time, on antimissile systems, to the extent that in this respect they were and are ahead in many aspects. There is even a suspicion that they are further ahead also on the space shield project as such.

What would happen, Rizzo wonders, on the day that both the superpowers had the space shield? Rizzo advances two hypotheses. The first envisions Europe included in defensive system of the American space shield: in this case it would have delegated to the United States its own nuclear security, however, with the United States and the USSR protected by their respective shields (the "double sanctuary" hypothesis), our continent would be exposed to the danger of a war with conventional weapons, a sector in which the USSR dominates us; thus, there would be a double European dependence: to America and to Russia. The second case: Europe not integrated into the American space shield: then it would end up being exposed to both a Soviet nuclear attack (still through the "double sanctuary"), that is, a localized nuclear war, and a conflict fought with conventional weapons; in conclusion: total dependency to the USSR. Rizzo warns: These extreme hypotheses do not have to come about for Europe to lose its independence, it is sufficient that the Soviet Union have the capability for intervention and intimidation so that Europe is totally "Finlandized" (the "better Red than dead" of unhappy memory).

Besides, the situation would not change much even in the case of confirmed unachievability of the space shield, particularly if the feared "decoupling" of America from Europe occurs (with withdrawal of the Euromissiles): not being secure from the Soviet nuclear threat, who would guarantee that America would be inclined to risk something to defend us, especially if we have relaxed our concrete commitments in the alliance, if we have destroyed the mechanism of direct U.S. involvement in our defense? Here also, the extreme case of conflict is not necessary to make concrete the condition of dependency to the

USSR, of "Finlandization."

In conclusion: only the Euromissiles, the credible American presence in Europe, today offer us a guarantee; and, under the best of hypotheses, only participation in the U.S. space shield, if it works, would tomorrow enable us to return to a missile zero option, but in that covered by the shield: what we said previously. Obvious and rational courses of behavior: today hold onto the Euromissiles, and in the meanwhile follow the "Japanese road" as regards participation in the shield (taking into account that, at the worst, the effects of technological fallout in the civilian sector would not be insignificant).

But is Europe thinking this way? And America, how is it thinking? Here the predictions become pessimistic. Delors, who has had the courage (intellectual more than political) to speak out clearly, seems to be operating in a vacuum; even if someone admits that he is right in principle, that person does not then act (as Delors asks); only Mrs Thatcher has the specific sense of a tie that must remain indissoluble between the United Kingdom and America (but with a vision that is purely and historically Anglo-American, and not a vision that is Euro-American); France, which raises objections to the zero option, does not practice what it preaches, because it has never wanted a direct link with America, while pursuing the Napoleonic dreams of its own inadequate nuclear "force de frappe"; Germany is experiencing national-neutralistic temptations; Italy, which has finally had a rational foreign policy with the Socialist-led government, runs the risk of turning to an "Andreotti"-style foreign policy: friends of everyone, cunning toward everyone, except with ourselves, in the name of trade and business with everyone, and in the name of the always possible "historic compromises" on the internal clef. Finally, America, which, with Reagan in disarray after the repeated scandals, is in danger of pursuing the dream of recovering prestige precisely through a "big disarmament agreement" with Gorbachev, on the back of Europe, an agreement that finds allied in America the leftist politicians of the Democratic Party, eternally naive, and the rightist politicians of the Republican Party, eternally ready to sound the isolationist siren of "fortress America," outside of which all the Philistines can perish. This is the danger of the negotiation as today conceived on the eve of Shultz' visit to Moscow (in mid-April) and in anticipation of the nth Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Not even the warning signs recurring here and there through Europe, such as the assassination of key men in the Atlantic organization, or General Giorgieri killed in Rome by terrorists on 20 March, have been valued at their true significance: it is true that this is termed a Euroterrorism, and not only a resurgence of purely national terrorism, however people are not drawing the operational conclusions, they are not coordinating everything in an overall view, they do not understand that lowering the guard against the external threat is the same thing as lowering it against the internal threat, that one yielding automatically leads to the other. On television, the day after Giorgieri's assassination, it was disconcerting, to use an educated term, to see politicians appear, with Andreotti, then charged with forming a government, in the lead, talking about their problems of party portion as if nothing had happened, as if that general had died in a simple auto accident, and not in a shooting planned much further away than in a Rome apartment.

Except for one (Montanelli's IL GIORNALE), the papers have also given little attention to a debate that has been going on in Moscow during this same period. In the name of "glasnost," or openness, with which they are bamboozling us more than the Soviet citizens (who know on their own back the limits of the Gorbachev "liberalization"), people in Moscow have been asking themselves, just to speak badly of Brezhnev and well of Gorbachev, as always happens there when the predecessor and the incumbent are involved, why the SS-20 missiles were stationed if they are now prepared to withdraw them. Was this not a mistake? as a spokesman of the regime, Aleksandr Bovin, asked a general, Yuriy Lebedev; didn't we waste our money? The response was an embarrassed one, wrote many Italian papers, pleased, and having done a good job mainly at censoring the real answer in favor of Gorbachev: that now the SS-20's can go to the museum, because, said Lebedev, "we now possess more sophisticated weapons." (IL GIORNALE, 12 March, dispatch from Moscow by Fernando Mezzetti.) The whole "disarmament" issue is contained in this answer, as the issue is conceived by the experts: the old instruments are thrown out, and the new ones take over in their place.

The generals, on this side or that side of the "iron curtain," or of the "wall" if the other word does not please you and tastes too much of the "Cold War," they know these things. Here, in the Western camp, NATO Commander in Chief Rogers opposed and continues to oppose the zero option (Lucio Leante, "The Revolt of the Generals Against the Zero Option," MONDOPERAIO No 12/1986.), and his imminent successor is expected to do no less. It is hoped that some political figure will pay attention to him before it is too late. Unless the generals are regarded as only useful to be killed by the first gunman that shows up, to the indifference of most people, and particularly the politicians.

To conclude: It is time that we also, despite the government crisis and the alchemies of the parties and movements, should pay attention to what is about to happen in the way of selling out the defense of the continent in order to avoid the burdens necessary for defense. Pirani put it well, discussing the 30th anniversary of the EEC, in referring to the profile of the Community that "remains municipal," of this Europe that remains a "municipality," because it has always delegated to others the task of creating policy, of providing for defense, and even for producing the common currency (the dollar). It is just that things are changing, and--writes Pirani--"while the criticism is also justified of those who point to the U.S. budget deficit (221 billion in 1986) as the real weakness in the American economy and the reason for the fluctuation of the dollar, how can one ignore that within that deficit is counted \$177 billion spent for the participation in NATO, and therefore primarily to defend Europe? It is thus not without importance that an amendment to reduce the forces stationed in Europe was rejected by only 55 votes to 41, despite the intervention of Reagan and the supreme commander of the Atlantic Pact. (...) Thus, Gorbachev's initiative at the same time produces a great hope for detente but also a great fear: that the arrival point will be accompanied by a retirement by the United States from the role of unconditional defender of a Europe that has thus far refused to pay the costs of its own security. And at that point the unbalance in relation to the neighbor Eastern power will translate into a real threat, absolutely conditioning." (Editorial by Mario Pirani in REPUBBLICA 19 March).

In order to avoid this fate, it is not necessary that Europe become a "warmonger." As I wrote in MONDOPERAIO after the Reykjavik summit, we do have a line of negotiation; but for reduction (balanced and controlled) of the respective arsenals, not for their zeroing; it is a matter of retaining the weapons necessary for defense, and, if Europe does not want to build an adequate nuclear deterrent force, of American proportions, it must at least guarantee coverage by the American nuclear missile system, pending entry (not by the service entrance) into a space defense system, if that proves feasible.

Any other working hypothesis would result in suicide for our survival and independence, which must be linked. Today, we must bitterly admit, after the toasts in celebration of the 30th anniversary of Europe, that our continent has not become adult, even though for statistical reasons it could certainly have that illusion. It will not do so as long as it does not have its own defense. In the absence of such a defense, Europe cannot toss out the only effective guarantee remaining: the direct American involvement, and the credible one is the missile system, as an effective deterrent force, as long as the time never arrives of the presence on European soil of a contingent of American troops armed only with conventional weapons.

If Europe reduces itself to zero value in the field of defense, it will not count for anything in any other field. It will only have the value of the testimony of its own past, as a memory. And it would become, this yes, "open."

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CSO:5200/2538

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ANDREOTTI DISCUSSES FUTURE EUROMISSILE ACCORD

AU201340 Rome ANSA in English 1210 GMT 20 May 87

[Text](ANSA) Rome, May 20 — It is "plausible" to expect an accord on Euromissiles before the year is out given the recent positive developments in U.S.-Soviet negotiations to reduce and control nuclear weapons, Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti told the House Foreign and Defense Committees here today.

Such an agreement would mean a marked reduction in missiles already in place and would be accompanied by new mechanisms of verification which would bolster mutual confidence and reliability, he said.

The Italian Government looks with favor on an eventual zero option extended to missiles having a range of between 500 and 1,000 kilometers but also will not lose sight of Italy's solidarity with its European allies, he went on. Consultations are still underway between Italy, the USA and the other European allies, and in particular with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he said.

It was clear, he said, that the problem of nuclear arms with a range under 500 kilometers, as well as conventional weapons must also not be ignored.

For Andreotti it was a mistake to think that disarmament accords could induce the USA to lessen its involvement with European defense. The United States and Europe are essential to each other in terms of mutual security, he said. This is the reason for American participation, along with Canada, in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, he said.

European security can only be guaranteed within an Atlantic framework, with a pooling of human and material resources in Europe and the USA, Andreotti continued.

He said there were promising developments for a restructurization of security at much lower levels but recalled the principle once enunciated by Henry Kissinger to the effect that absolute security is only possible at the expense of the security of others.

He hoped that beginning with the Atlantic Council meeting to be held June 11 and 12 in Reykjavik, there would come clear signals that a nuclear arms agreement is in the wings for Europe.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER COMMENTS ON DISARMAMENT TALKS

AU201350 Rome ANSA in English 1245 GMT 20 May 87

[Text](ANSA) Rome, May 20 — The state of East-West negotiations in terms of disarmament was the focus of a report to the House Foreign and Defense Committees today by Defense Minister Remo Gaspari.

After Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti reported on the diplomatic aspects of the disarmament negotiations, Gaspari dwelled on the technical-military aspects, with special reference to recent Soviet proposals for the elimination of Euromissiles and short-range ballistics missiles.

He outlined that significant stages in a process in which negotiators had moved from a strategic doctrine of a massive response to a more flexible one. [sentence as received]

Gaspari singled out the continued fact that the Soviets still have an overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons. He cited the fact that in Europe the Warsaw Pact nations have 230 divisions as against NATO's 121; 52,000 trucks compared to NATO's 24,000; 42,000 cannons, compared to NATO's 18,000 and 2800 interceptor planes compared to NATO's 1,100.

The defense minister also recalled NATO's attempts to open a constructive dialogue with Eastern Europe for a mutual balanced reduction in conventional forces in central Europe. Concrete results are still far off, however, he said. As a result, the West must still count on a nuclear defense to guarantee security on the European continent and to maintain world peace, Gaspari said.

As to verification of weapons cuts, the defense minister voiced full satisfaction for the fact that for the first time since the start of disarmament talks, the Soviets have agreed to the principle of on-site inspections.

The current stage of negotiations is marked by close consultations among all the allies and a deep review of all the implied consequences of any choices adopted, he said.

Gaspari voiced confidence that the coming Brussels meeting at the end of May of the NATO Defense Planning Committee would serve as a useful forum to compare and possibly forge a joint European position to set before the United States.

The coming Atlantic Council meeting to be held in Reykjavik will serve to present a unitary alliance position on disarmament, he said.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: CDU/CSU'S RUEHE INTERVIEWED ON ZERO SOLUTION

DW300940 Cologne EXPRESS in German 30 Apr 87 p 2

[Interview with CDU/CSU Deputy Group Chairman Volker Ruehe by correspondent Friedemann Weckbach-Mara in Bonn; date not given]

[Text] Bonn — Volker Ruehe, deputy CDU/CSU group chairman and disarmament expert, has returned from the United States. *Express* asked him: Is there a common answer, at the end of your U.S. visit, from Bonn and Washington to the new disarmament proposals by communist party chief Gorbachev?

Ruehe: "Yes. First, all of us in NATO fully agree that an agreement to abolish longer range intermediate-range missiles (over 1,000 km) can be achieved this year. Also, on shorter range missiles, Bonn and Washington are in absolute agreement that the specific Soviet proposals in Geneva are, in the current form absolutely unacceptable to the West. The demand to include the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missile is a decisive obstacle."

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG PAPER VIEWS REAGAN STATEMENT, ZERO SOLUTION

DW301100 Bonn DIE WELT in German 30 Apr 87 p 4

[Ruediger Moniac article: "Irritations in Bonn After Reagan's Proposals"]

[Text] The American President's recent statements on "Euro-missiles" do not make it all easier for Germans to achieve, together with the United States, a common attitude to Gorbachev's proposal for a "second European zero solution" for missiles with a range of under 1,000 km. Reagan pointed out his interest to journalists in dismantling U.S. systems in that category deployed in Europe, saying that after a "double zero solution" Europeans would not be helpless because "thousands of nuclear warheads" are still available. The President's statement has shocked some government people responsible for Western European security. They must realize that Reagan obviously does not seem to have a complete view of special European problems that have been created by the continuous Soviet disarmament offers. His citing the nuclear weapons on U.S. ships and aircraft can only mean sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) on strategic U.S. submarines and bomb-carrying F-111 aircraft. However, with such nuclear deterrence, which the President wants to offer to the European NATO allies as a substitute for the one that will disappear through "extended zero solutions," more insecurity would be created instead of more security. The weapons Reagan means are unsuitable to having a deterrent effect on the Kremlin, neither technical, nor because of their deployment. That opinion is shared by leading military planners of the integrated NATO staffs, as well as in Bonn, where suspicion is

growing that special German security problems are not being taken seriously enough any more in the United States. Therefore, Bonn feels virtually left out.

Why are the SLBM and the F-111 unsuitable as substitutes? The bombers, because the enormously improved Warsaw Pact anti-air defense makes it unlikely that they will be able to find their military targets in the hinterland. In addition, they would have to take off from Western European air bases for their eastern missions. Those bases, however, would be under concentrated conventional fire from Soviet long-range aircraft, so that it would not even be certain if NATO's F-111 bombers would be ready to take off when needed for nuclear missions. The U.S. SLBM belongs to the strategic arsenal. They are centrally coordinated by U.S. strategic action planning. If some of them were fired to relieve the front in central Europe, the East would have the impression that the United States had launched a general nuclear strike. It could have the consequence that the Soviet Union, in order to anticipate from its point of view the quickly expected total nuclear strike of the United States, could launch a strike against the entire strategic potential of the United States. In such a scenario, is the use of SLBM to the advantage of the "European theater" at all credible, ask concerned Europeans? The experts say no. They question whether the United States would, for the defense of Europe, immediately and without any interim step of using nuclear weapons, expose its core to the reaction of the other side.

Therefore, Bonn security planners continue to see the unrestricted necessity for a land-based nuclear potential under U.S. responsibility. At present 80-120 ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km must be kept absolutely ready for action if the strategy of deterrence should remain halfway applicable and thus credible. On this line the Federal Government is trying to achieve agreement, not just for itself. It wants the European allies to follow that line, and most of all -- and particularly -- the United States.

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GENSCHER INTERVIEWED FOLLOWING TALKS WITH SHULTZ

DW120636 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1945 GMT 11 May 87

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Gerd Helbig in Washington on 11 May; on the "Heute-Journal" program — recorded]

[Text] [Helbig] In your case, the secretary of state and the President do not need to do much persuading. But what is the position within the coalition?

[Genscher] As I have said before, we will include our European partners' position, and after what I have heard here today, I am well aware of the fact that there is a decision to be made that is of special importance for us Germans. As Germans we are always particularly interested in a positive development in the general climate between Washington and Moscow, because in such a climate we can best implement our national and European interests, including our relations with the GDR.

[Helbig] You do not feel yourself under pressure. Nonetheless, do you have a time schedule?

[Genscher] Nobody wants to putting off a decision. We want to make it in due time. However, we should not put ourselves under pressure, when our friends are not doing it.

[Helbig] Do you feel like the old maid [Schwarzer Peter] in the FRG as far as the Europeans are concerned on that issue?

[Genscher] Not at all. But I think that we have no reason to complain when the Americans take seriously what is said in Europe. There were situations in which the Europeans complained that decisions were made without taking their opinion into consideration. Therefore, we must not talk about the old maid now, when the Americans want to hear our opinion and include it in their considerations.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

KOHL REAFFIRMS REJECTION OF DOUBLE ZERO OPTION

LD122144 Hamburg DPA in German 2018 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Trier (DPA) — Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has reaffirmed his rejection of a double zero option for medium-range weapons following Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's return from the United States. At an event in Trier this evening, Kohl said that there continues to be a need to negotiate with regard to the shorter-range (500-1,000 km) nuclear missiles. Kohl described the Kremlin leaders as "continuing to be ice-cold calculating power politicians of a communist regime" who returned to the negotiating table only because of the West's steadfastness.

Now, for the first time in 20 years, concrete disarmament is possible, but one must not give in "in a sector which at the moment seems to the Soviet Union to be particularly agreeable" and thus risk a reduction in German security, the chancellor said. These statements met with loud protests from several hundred supporters of the peace movement, who called for the Federal Government's agreement to the double zero option.

Kohl accused those groups who were calling for a boycott of the population census planned for 25 May of a "fascist attitude." They are merely interested in undermining the state's authority, and this was something which, "as at the end of the Weimar Republic, bears deeply fascist traits", the chancellor said.

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: CDU/CSU'S RUEHE CALLS FOR RETAINING CERTAIN MISSILES

LD131730 Hamburg DPA in German 1446 GMT 13 May 87

[Excerpt] Hamburg (DPA) — According to a CDU/CSU policy document, missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km must be retained in any disarmament of medium-range missiles in Europe. On behalf of his group's members, Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, who was briefed on the British disarmament stance in London on Wednesday, put forward the view in the paper — made public today — that Europe needs nuclear weapons as long as a conventional imbalance in favor of the Soviets existed.

In Ruehe's view, a double zero solution in medium-range missiles, as favored by the FDP — that is, the complete elimination of longer-range missiles (1,000 to 5,500 km) and shorter-range missiles (500 to 1,000 km) — would constitute a "special threat" to the Germans from missiles with a range under 500 km. In the view of the CDU/CSU, a drastic reduction of about 50 percent is necessary in the case of missiles under 500 km. The Soviet's true strength, said Ruehe, lies in their conventional superiority. For this reason, the paper states, they could "follow one zero solution in nuclear weapons with another" and would still improve their military situation.

It appears that this view is still not shared by the British Government, Ruehe said after a 40-minute talk with Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe. There was agreement with the Thatcher government that the longer-range INF missiles would have to be eliminated, Ruehe said in London. The British Government is still forming an opinion about the extended zero option, the elimination of missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km. There is agreement with the British that some nuclear weapons are still necessary for averting war in the foreseeable

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BAVARIA'S STRAUSS STRESSES 'COMMON LINE' WITH KOHL

LD151708 Hamburg DPA in German 1532 GMT 15 May 87

[Text] Munich (DPA) — Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) stressed after the chancellor's statement on medium-range nuclear missiles that the "greatest clarity of words and thought, especially in technical details" is required. Strauss told DPA in Munich that he has always supported explanations, the formulation of which renders different, even contradictory, interpretations impossible from the start.

The common line of the chancellor, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, and of the CSU coalition partner is: zero option on medium-range missiles of longer range (1,000 to 5,000 kilometers), and on medium-range missiles of shorter range (500 to 1,000 kilometers) — a limit on both sides at the lowest possible level. This means no zero option on 0 to 500 kilometers, but the inclusion of missiles of this range in the overall question, "but not with the aim of a zero option."

In the 0 to 500 kilometer ranges, there must be distinctions drawn between various weapon systems. The Soviets have a nine-to-tenfold superiority in the 0 to 150 kilometer area and a thousand-fold superiority in the 150 to 500 kilometer field. If all nuclear weapons are withdrawn, then the NATO troops will be confronted with the enormous conventional weapon superiority of

the Warsaw Pact, and, in particular, of the Soviet Army. For that reason, the chancellor is calling in the case of shorter range medium-range missiles for a reduction of the upper limit to a lower level, and in the case of the 0 to 500 kilometer range, for a substantial reduction in Soviet missiles, particularly in the 150 to 500 kilometer field.

Strauss said the chancellor was right when he accounted for his standpoint by saying that Europe must not be allowed to be uncoupled from the United States and that the Federal Republic must not be allowed to be isolated in Europe. The superiority of the East in the range of up to 500 kilometers is a threat to the existence of the Germans, because the targets of these missiles are almost exclusively on German soil. "For that reason, the chancellor rightly demands no full zero option on the 500 to 1,000 kilometer range, and a substantial reduction in Soviet missiles in the area from 0 to 500 kilometers, but no zero option." All the NATO states, and particularly the Federal Republic, will not be in a position to deploy sufficient additional conventional forces to come even close to balancing the Soviet superiority.

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG CHANCELLOR'S AIDE CLEARS KOHL'S DISARMAMENT STAND

DW172105 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1945 GMT 15 May 87

[Interview with Horst Teltschik, the chancellor's foreign policy adviser, by moderator Peter Voss on the "Heute-Journal" program — recorded]

[Text] [Voss] Mr Teltschik, the topic is not a poetic one, but it makes one think of Heine [German poet] who wrote — I do not know what it really means. The FDP is puzzling: Apparently, the matter was not coordinated with the Foreign Ministry. Franz-Josef Strauss also raised the question. What does it really mean then?

[Teltschik] Mr Voss, the chancellor wanted to transmit three messages with his declaration today. The first — that we can reach an excellent result on disarmament this year, namely the removal of all longer-range intermediate-range missiles. That would be a great step, almost a historic one, to which the Federal Government made a considerable contribution.

[Voss] But there is no quarrel about that.

[Teltschik] No, thank God there is no quarrel about it. That there is no quarrel over that in Europe is due to the Federal Government -- that must and should not be forgotten. The second message is that one cannot assess disarmament proposals without regarding the context. Instead, one must see the overall armament context as it exists in East and West. For that reason, the chancellor pointed out that it is not only the systems in the 500-1,000 km range, but also the systems below it that cannot be left without being taken into account. Second [as recorded]: The conventional and chemical systems, where the Soviet Union has a considerable preponderance, must also be taken into consideration. Then he said -- and this is the third message -- that we are not under any time pressure. The Soviet Union's chief negotiator Vorontsov said to us that they agreed on a negotiating period up to about early autumn with the Americans. That means we have enough time to come to a reasonable solution.

[Voss] Well, we heard the messages. But before they are believed, there are questions, questions that are raised by many. When the federal chancellor says that the nuclear weapons starting from zero, let me put it like that, must be included, but also chemical and conventional weapons — is that a demand for future negotiations, or is that a precondition for negotiations?

[Teltschik] The federal chancellor in his declaration did not say that the systems between zero and 500 km range must be

included in an agreement. He merely said that, regarding systems between 500 and 1,000 km, one must also think of a zero solution situation, with the systems between zero and 500 remaining. Let me just mention one example — the Soviet Union has 583 systems of 150-500 km range missiles that are exclusively targeted on the FRG. The West has no systems against that. Thus, the FRG is especially threatened, a situation that cannot be ignored.

[Voss] But, if I understand it correctly, that is no precondition for negotiations.

[Teltschik] That is no precondition for negotiations. We just said that the decision we make now will also be made to include the background of those existing systems.

[Voss] If that is so, Mr Teltschik, why does the federal chancellor not simply state, as Mr Genscher does, that we constructively consider Mr Gorbachev's proposal — zero option above 5,000; zero option for 1,000-5,000; and zero-option for 500-1,000 km — consider them and present our interests and conditions on the negotiating table, but for the time being we just welcome the proposals. That is a simple position, which would make it much easier for you during the current election campaigns which are also of some importance in this context.

[Teltschik] Mr Voss, if you read the federal chancellor's statements that he made in the last 2 years, since General Secretary Gorbachev has been in office, you will see that this federal chancellor and this Federal Government indeed have considered the Soviet proposals in the most constructive way, more constructively than most of our alliance partners. Our contributions have made it possible to obtain the definite result -- to reach the first disarmament step. If we had followed the proposals and advice of the opposition during the last 2 to 4 years, then we would not have progressed this far today.

[Voss] Do you say that with a view to Mr Genscher?

[Teltschik] Mr Genscher is a member of this Federal Government. He fully supports the chancellor's government statement of last week, because it has been agreed upon with him word for word.

[Voss] Many thanks, Mr Teltschik.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CHANCELLOR KOHL COMMENTS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

LD161759 Hamburg DPA in German 1549 GMT 16 May 87

[Text] Goslar (DPA)— In the view of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for the first time in 20 years there exists a chance to reach effective agreements on disarmament issues. The Federal Government will do everything in its power to achieve viable solutions for all parties involved, Kohl said on Saturday at a meeting of the Pan-European Union [not further identified] in Goslar. Concerning this important decision, however, he would not allow himself to be unnecessarily pressured by time. Kohl also called for the abolition of theater nuclear weapons up to the 500 km range. "This is not a special German way, but only the perception of justified German interests."

The federal chancellor warned the delegates against an attitude of resignation regarding European matters. Historical problems that have lasted for centuries, cannot be corrected in a few years. "Our aim is peace throughout Europe." Peace and freedom are not, however, to be had gratis. "Now here are states bound together in such friendship as in the European Community," Kohl stated. The EC, however, is only one part of Europe, a dynamic part. The German question can only be solved within a European framework. There is no special German way, the chancellor stressed. By standing on the sidelines, the Germans would endanger peace in the world and create a dangerous power vacuum in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: SPD'S VOGEL ON KOHL'S 'GROTESQUE' WEAPONS STAND

LD181226 Hamburg DPA in German 1154 GMT 18 May 87

[Text] Berlin (DPA) — The attitude of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) to the double zero option is, in the opinion of SPD Bundestag Group Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, getting "more and more grotesque." With the "nebulous statement" by the chancellor on Friday, the treatment of this topic has hit rock bottom, Vogel said on Monday to the business executive of his group, at the Berlin Reichstag.

The SPD official thinks that, among other things, the curious impression has arisen that the chancellor is demanding the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe at exactly the same time as other leading CDU/CSU union officials are rejecting this de-nuclearization on the grounds that it dramatically increases the danger of a conventional war and puts the spirit of the NATO alliance in question.

As a reaction to this "criminal incompetence," no one is taking the Federal Republic seriously any more, Vogel said. As the session of the NATO defense ministers at Stavanger has shown, the Federal Republic is now totally isolated within the alliance. Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) gives the appearance of wanting the zero option for medium-range missiles of shorter range, but of not being in a position to implement this line. This "circumstance which is as chaotic as it is dangerous" must be stopped, the SPD group leader demanded.

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GENSCHER COMMENTS ON FRG ZERO OPTION STANCE

LD212040 Hamburg DPA in German 1434 GMT 21 May 87

[By DPA correspondent Hans-Juergen Hofer]

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA) — FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has today countered views expressed at home and abroad about an alleged German go-it-alone attitude leading toward nationalism or even the East.

The foreign minister confirmed when asked shortly before his flight to Paris for the Franco-German consultations that he saw sufficient cause for renewed and unambiguous emphasis of the position of German foreign policy as being embedded in the Western and European framework. This includes the frequently appearing doubt about U.S. readiness to defend Europe, skepticism about the French motives for their very hesitant stance on the Soviets' disarmament proposals, and finally the "talk" about reunification. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, a compromise is looming between the government camp and the FDP in what is in fact the factor that unleashed the discussion in the alliance: the debate about the chances of zero options on short- and medium-range missiles.

FDP officials repeatedly stress that in the allegedly most controversial area between the zero and 500 km range, there has always been agreement with the CDU/CSU about including this category in negotiations.

CDU experts in Bonn are expecting that the federal chancellor

could announce to the Bundestag on 4 June the broadly drawn up and not officially confirmed plan, as the unanimous stance of the federal government:

1. Zero option for all medium-range missiles between 1,000 and [figure indistinct] km range, which has not been a controversial point.
2. Zero option for the 500 to 1,000 km range under the condition that the Bundeswehr is allowed to keep its old Pershing 1A missiles, with the nuclear warheads under U.S. lock and key, as "insurance."
3. At least a concrete and binding commitment to further negotiations for the lowest category, which has the most weapons stationed in the Federal Republic, those of the zero to 500 km range. Here equal but lower upper limits should be agreed to by both sides and the modernizing of certain remaining stocks be permitted.

The time factor would allow approval of the first two categories without the third zero option having to be signed at the same time.

As the elimination of the first two categories would be spread over several years, there would be sufficient brakes available to allow a stop in the event that progress did not take place as agreed in group three. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG DAILY VIEWS MISSILE TALKS, EUROPEAN INTERESTS

DW261230 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 May 87 p 12

[Guenther Gillesen editorial: "On the Nerve Ending of the Alliance"]

[Text] People still have not quite realized what "Reykjavik" means --- an existential crisis for the Atlantic alliance. U.S. policy is trying to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union at Western Europe's expense. It certainly is not in the United States' long-term interest to see the Soviet Union rise to the position of the dominant power in all Europe. But the mere fact that Washington was temporarily wrong in that respect has deeply affected the alliance.

Are more than 300,000 U.S. troops in the Federal Republic not a much more valuable guarantee than a few missiles could be? Are those troops not supported by U.S. nuclear weapons based on ships, strategic bombers, and intercontinental missiles? Those are plausible objections, but they miss the decisive point. Nuclear weapons are the last resort of NATO's war prevention strategy. It not only is important for the American leading power to risk the security of its territory for the security of Western Europe, but it is also important for the adversary to see that clearly. By removing all intermediate-range weapons, the United States would signal to the Soviet Union that it was loosening the close ties that have always existed and was satisfying the Soviet wish to establish a "strategic" distinction between the superpowers' territories and those of their allies. Since the end of the war, the Soviet Union has tried to achieve hegemony in Europe in that way. The United States has always countered that with the principle of collective defense. That principle is now to be dropped. What is disputed is not the wish for nuclear disarmament as such, but in what respect, in what order, and to what extent it should take place.

With the 1979 two-track decision and the deployment of land-based intermediate-range missiles, the alliance told the Soviet leadership that it saw itself as a community sharing risks in solidarity. The United States could well have deployed the intermediate-range weapons on ships. However, that would have excluded the Europeans. By deploying them on land, the Europeans participated. The importance of those weapons lies in the fact that they provide for deterrence from European soil by targeting the adversary --- the Soviet Union. Since then a much greater number of short-range nuclear weapons have been removed from Europe, and NATO has "lost nuclear weight." The alliance could

continue on that road, even without any Soviet return concession, if a certain minimum quantity of longer range intermediate-range weapons were retained.

Starting with a "zero option" for those very weapons (instead of possibly achieving it in the end) would mean depriving disarmament policy involving equal security of its strategic logic. Once the intermediate-range weapons have been dismantled, there is no logical argument against removing smaller nuclear weapons. The zipper is partly open. Moscow only needs to pull and the double zero solution will be followed by a triple and quadruple solution. What will come about at best is the "singularization" of the Federal Republic. It would be the only one among the nonnuclear NATO powers to accommodate shorter range nuclear weapons, which are more suitable for self-deterrence than deterrence --- assuming the Federal Republic in domestic policy terms could tolerate assuming a special position in the alliance as an exposed country with a nuclear potential.

During the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Stavanger, initial signs of disintegration appeared. The British Government, which is in the middle of an election campaign, rejected the request by the German defense minister and the federal chancellor to prevent at least the second "zero option." The other NATO countries with U.S. intermediate-range weapons --- the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy --- took to their heels, too, hoping, like the British, to get rid of the American cruise missiles. Bonn is isolated. There is more at stake than just one weapon.

What should be done? Prospects to reverse the order of nuclear disarmament in Europe, which was turned upside down at Reykjavik, are poor, especially if isolated from the issue of conventional defense. It now seems to be urgently necessary for Europeans to do more to protect their interests. Only much greater cooperation among the most important NATO members can offer protection from abrupt policy changes of our main ally. Those members would strengthen the "European pillar" within NATO and would at the same time be a better partner for the Americans.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK'S HOWE DISCUSSES NUCLEAR DEFENSE, SECURITY ISSUES

DW120701 Bonn DIE WELT in German 9-10 May 87 p 6

[Interview with Sir Goeffrey Howe, secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, by correspondent Rainer Gatermann; date and place not given]

[Excerpt]

Die Welt: The demand to abolish shorter range intermediate-range nuclear missiles (SRINF) makes the current discussion about arms control especially explosive. Will the north atlantic alliance find a common denominator on that issue?

Howe: Particularly on that issue the most thorough negotiations and consultations have taken place. Thus far, we have been in a position to make joint decisions. From the moment that we submitted the first INF proposal, NATO made it absolutely clear that in connection with an agreement on dismantling longer range intermediate-range missiles (LRINF), nuclear SRINF systems must be also discussed as a part of the basic LRINF treaty. That was done in the name of NATO in 1981. It was a decisive point in our position. It would make little sense to agree to a LRINF agreement if we cannot simultaneously prevent its being sabotaged by the Soviet Union with SRINF systems. That original position means two things: "freezing" the Soviet SRINF potential and the right of the west to adjust its potential to that level. That is exactly in accordance with the U.S. draft that is currently being discussed. We have been following a common western line. It is that line that has brought us this far. Now, the alliance is discussing the acceptance of a zero/zero solution for SRINF. This would create a number of problems that we will examine most thoroughly

Die Welt: Do you consider SRINF a unity, or would you subdivide it into certain ranges?

Howe: The language of experts has already divided them up. There are the nuclear weapons with a shorter range — 500-1,000 km. Those with a range of less than 500 km are considered short range missiles. It is very strange; the jargon is completely incomprehensible to nonexperts. However, for analytical reasons, we have split the system. Now, we maintain now that a connection between LRINF and SRINF is necessary, as well as the right to

adjust SRINF arsenals. Every change in that position must be discussed within the alliance.

Die Welt: Is there a "linkage" between disarmament and human rights?

Howe: I know from the French and German foreign ministers and from the government chiefs that they emphasize the importance of human rights. Maybe have just more clearly accentuated what we all actually think? The more frequently we see that the Soviet Government acts properly towards its citizens in human rights matters, the more we are inclined to trust it in other matters. However, there is no linkage. We do not say: "If you do not treat dissidents this way or that way, we will not discuss arms control."

Die Welt: Some time ago, Great Britain was not a particular advocate of reviving the West European Union (WEU). Now you have acted as its advocate...

Howe: I very much want to avoid the impression that between my Brussels speech and the 1984 proposal to revive the WEU there has been a change of attitude. We maintained from the beginning of that process that it is worthwhile. I remember a December 1984 Berlin press conference where I stated that I welcomed the WEU revival wholeheartedly. The WEU must play a unique role with its supporting function as a discussion forum for European defense, its working, and its presentation.

Die Welt: However, you are emphasizing the defense complex.

Howe: Since we began the revival process, and particularly since we had the joint meetings of foreign and defense ministers, we have worked together intensely to improve European defense and security. I have said that to the extent Europe finds a common denominator for its action and words, the more attention we will gain in the alliance as a whole, that can only be good.

Die Welt: Are there any restrictions?

more closely. The WEU can make Europe a more important partner for the United States. And the closer the partners cooperate, the more seriously we will be taken outside the alliance.

Die Welt: A few weeks ago, Paris expressed concern that the FRG might yield to Mr Gorbachev's charm offensive and

become more receptive to temptations. How do you assess Bonn's position after the most recent Moscow disarmament proposals?

Howe: I believe that none of us has any doubts about the West German position. If you study our speeches on that subject you will find very similar opinions — For instance, Mr Raimond's, Mr Genscher's, and mine. A few weeks ago, Mr Genscher said we ought to be ready to take the Soviets at their word. That is very like Jean Bernard Raimond's words that we should be double careful. Yes, we must take good care not to confound presentation with substance. However, we must not overlook the real opportunity of progress either. What all of us really want to say is that the true Soviet intentions at negotiations and discussions have to be examined. If there are really intentions to make progress — good.

Die Welt: Do you set different priorities for deterrence, security, and disarmament, or do you put security at the top, without qualification?

Howe: As I said before, it is like love and marriage, or a horse and carriage. You cannot have one without the other. And that also holds true for the alliance. We must be determined to defend ourselves, and that includes — in a key position — deterrence. What we need is security on a lower level of distrust. I think, in this respect I agree with Mr Genscher.

Howe: The only restriction we have imposed — and I think everyone will agree with us — is that defense and military decisions should continue to be made in the alliance. Nonetheless, the WEU has to play a significant role in strengthening the European pillar — NATO stands on two strong pillars.

Die Welt: What will the United State reaction be?

Howe: Recently, I told a group of American visitors that the United States has often asked us why we cannot find a common position. And now when we are doing so, they criticize us. We must ensure that the European side does a good job and cooperates well with the U.S. side. In the alliance, we need two good sides.

Die Welt: Will there be a revival of the entente cordiale, perhaps within the framework of the WEU?

Howe: As for problems of defense and security, our relationship with the French Government is certainly very close. That is natural, because we are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and among the nuclear nations. I think it is in the interest of both countries to improve and extend our dialogue. It goes without saying that it would not harm our close cooperation with other NATO members, for instance, the FRG. However, after the Reykjavik summit meeting it has become increasingly clear that problems of defense and security require a clear and characteristic European voice. The alliance as a whole must remain the forum where decisions are made. However, we must build a more important European pillar in the alliance. As I said in my Brussels speech, the right institution to achieve that is the WEU. There, together with our six European partners, including the FRG, we will make determined efforts to reduce our European ideas to a common denominator and to cooperate

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CSO: 5240/085

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK GOVERNMENT GIVES 'QUALIFIED SUPPORT' TO SOVIET ARMS OFFER

LD141756 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1719 GMT 14 May 87

[By Tom McMullan, *Press Association* political staff]

[Text] Britain is prepared to give qualified support to the Soviet Union's double zero option proposals, the Foreign Office announced today.

The move to back the plan — for the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons from Europe — is expected to be emphasised by Mrs Thatcher and her senior ministers during the election campaign, in response to Labour attempts to brand the prime minister as a cold warrior.

The new British position — which may not please the West German Government — was set out by the Foreign Office in a five-point statement:

1. An agreement on longer-range intermediate weapons must include constraints on shorter-range systems. That is a long-standing NATO requirement.
2. The requirement for constraints on shorter-range systems could be met by equal ceilings at various levels down to zero.
3. The British Government could therefore accept a zero-zero offer for shorter-range intermediate weapons, provided that the conditions adequately safeguarded Western security.
4. NATO is now studying what level best meets the requirements of the North Atlantic alliance as a whole.
5. NATO's final position will be settled in these consultations.

As recently as Wednesday, a senior West German envoy, an adviser to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, flew to London to set out German objections to double zero. Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats have tended to favour an agreement on the longer-range intermediate weapons, whose range is regarded as more than 1,000 kilometres. But there were reservations on proposals for the shorter-range weapons.

However, West German Foreign Minister Mr Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his liberal Free Democrats are thought to favour removal of the shorter-range missiles from Europe, an attitude which has caused tension in the country's coalition.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

THATCHER SEES NO CONFLICT WITH KOHL'S STAND ON MISSILES

PM211725 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 21 May 87 p 17

[Interview with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by George Jones and Simon Heffer: "Marks & Spencer Is Bringing to the Many Living Standards That Were the Privilege of the Few. That's Toryism"; date not given]

[Excerpt] Question: On nuclear defence, is Germany's Chancellor Kohl's position in conflict with yours?

Answer: I don't think so. We have to understand that Germany is right in the front line and, if conventional war ever started, it would be her territories that would be overrun first. Europe is in a different position from either the United States or the Soviet Union. Neither is going to be invaded by conventional forces.

Many of us say that the Russians, knowing they have colossal superiority in conventional weapons, are trying to deprive us of the only thing which equalizes smaller countries with bigger ones, which is the nuclear weapon.

Winston Churchill said that the nuclear weapon is terrible but it's kept the peace in Europe. Don't give it up until you're sure that you've got something that will keep the peace as well, if not better.

/9274

CSO: 5240/084

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PEACE GROUP OFFICIAL ON GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 18 Mar 87 p 3

[Commentary in "Open Forum" column by Interchurch Peace Council staff member Gied ten Berge: "Gorbachev Proposal is Godsend of Our Time"; first paragraph is VOLKSKRANT introduction]

[Text] The proposals for arms control of Party Leader Gorbachev offer a "Godsend," in the eyes of Gied ten Berge, staff member of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV). The existing enemy image is being distorted. We must rapidly take advantage of that.

On 24 February we had a strange experience in the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV). That was four days before Gorbachev's proposal no longer to couple the elimination of medium-range missiles (INF) to the halting of Reagan's space weapons project (SDI). In this manner a treaty on the basis of the zero option would become possible. On that day of 24 February we talked with the East German Peace Council. On our part it was once again pointed out that the Soviet Union was not wise in insisting on that INF-SDI coupling. Insisting on the coupling, after all, would not be able to stop the American SDI program, while letting go of it might possibly release additional political energy against SDI.

Our discussion partners from the German Democratic Republic reacted irritatedly. In the past they had already implied once that the IKV got its instructions from the NATO. Now they said that during their stay in the Netherlands they fortunately had met other peace groups which were prepared to resist SDI unconditionally. No, those groups, just like they themselves, were completely in agreement with Gorbachev that any political step without a clear coupling with SDI was "senseless."

It is clear that the uncoupling of INF and SDI, which meanwhile has been announced, has also led to confusion in Eastern Europe and is not (nor was) without risks for the assertive Kremlin leader. Wasn't one of the best known explanations for the terminating of the deliberation in Reykjavik that the Soviet party leader couldn't go any farther because of the home front?

Factors

There are several factors which were important in reaching the breakthrough in the negotiations.

--First of all, of course, the mass movement which during the past years imprinted on the politicians the fact that the public no longer wants to live with balance-of-power thinking and an East-West relationship which can only be translated into horrifying terms of deterrence.

--Second, the Americans--intentionally or unintentionally. They replaced the nuclear bilateral arms control (SALT) with unilateral SDI security. And then there were Reagan's anti-nuclear remarks, up to and including Reykjavik. Those must even have saddened the scholars who just a few years ago on this same page severely remonstrated the IKV with "mutually assured deterrence."

--I want to emphasize especially a third factor, namely the drastic changes which are taking place in the Soviet Union at this time and which signify a unique opportunity for further detente. Those are developments which don't fit well in the frame of thinking of a military-strategic personality (we'll call him an MSP). That is due to a structural deficiency of the MSP, who can only observe social-political changeability in terms of an attack on his reality of stable numbers. Flexibility in the military response is reserved for war conditions in his view, and not for the peacetime situation.

Dirty Trick

What do we see happening? First of all we are shown by former General Berkhof that the Soviets are playing a dirty trick on us, that the coupling with American nuclear arms is going to pieces and that Europe thus will soon be caught in the Soviet pincer. And all that because of a Soviet Union which dismantles about 1000 Soviet nuclear warheads (over 3 times as many as on the NATO side). He doesn't say that that coupling is a political matter which can best be solved in a Soviet-American detente.

Political commentator Hilterman (AVRO [General Broadcasting Association]) recently stated that things are going very nicely in the Soviet Union, but that precisely now we must be careful not to weaken the strategic balance. In my view that is a reversed logic which is evidence of serious MSP symptoms.

The most stimulating was, as always, NRC [HANDELSBLAD] columnist Heldring. At least he wonders openly what the West will gain from a Soviet Union which is going to close a gap. He seems to fear that a Soviet Union which is no longer an indictment against itself might lose its traditional enemy image in our public opinion. It is not without reason that Gorbachev now is already more popular in our country than Reagan.

We do, however, touch on a point here that is very basic to the IKV. The IKV has always placed its devotion to disarmament and detente in a framework of humanitarian qualities of societies.

The Soviet party leader has pointed out, pleading his own case, that a democratization process in his country would mean a greater challenge to the West than any new armaments effort whatsoever. With that, he has a double-edged sword, of course.

--On the one hand, his reforms might acquire a permanent influence on our understanding of the Soviet state and, with that, on the sense of the East-West conflict.

--Those who are alarmed by this temptation don't realize that this process could also make the East European societies face urgent questions. The "glasnost," of course, also makes those societies vulnerable to a de-ideologizing and demystifying of the enemy. The temptation to conclude even more radical treaties with the enemy is also obvious.

The escalation also has its own logic and therefore it is cowardly and narrow-minded to groan precisely now about ancient conventional strength relations and about missiles which are not yet being removed. If we want to grasp the godsend of our time, we change the depressing obstacles into attractive new goals. Thus no new dual decision on the short range weapons, but new zero-options, the establishment of a nuclear arms-free zone and good reductions of conventional armament. It calls for more doesn't it?

Dreams

Would it actually be possible: Europe as experimental plot of shared security (Palme) instead of unilateral security (SDI)? And of continually greater shared concern for freedom and cultural quality? And of non-competing views on human rights?

This period offers a chance of even greater arms decrease because the very roots of the East-West conflict are being nibbled on, and the arms decrease is part of that nibbling.

Dreaming is necessary. That does not mean that we must walk with our heads in the clouds because of our enthusiasm about the current processes and opportunities. We, too, realize that it is very easy to regress into old, infertile patterns. We, too, realize that the process in the Soviet Union must be watched not only with expectation, but also with a critical attitude.

We, too, still have questions about the selectivity of the releases, the fate of our friends of the Trust group, the continuing atheist propaganda, the ultimate relationship between the state and civilian society. The question of whether that will continue after an INF accord is also stimulating to us.

With all these questions, however, we don't intend any cynicism or new apathy. We do, however, want more steps toward a better future for more than just Western Europe alone.

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CSO: 5200/2527

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FLEMISH SOCIALISTS, TINDEMANS VIEW GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

Interview of Chevalier, Coolsaet

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 18 Mar 87 pp 55-60

[Report on interview with SP Officials Pierre Chevalier and Rik Coolsaet by Frans Verleyen and Hubert van Humbeeck: "With the First Kiss Sleeping Beauty will Awaken again"; first paragraph is KNACK introduction]

[Text] The Flemish left was the political axis around which the peace movement turned in our country. What do they think of the recent developments in the area of disarmament? A discussion with Pierre Chevalier and Rik Coolsaet.

After Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to decouple the medium range missiles from SDI, the disarmament talks have suddenly greatly intensified. The Americans had always proposed that as well, and President Ronald Reagan really could use a little success abroad. Also the negotiators in Geneva--Max Kampelman for the United States and Yuliy Vorontsov for the Soviet Union--made positive sounds.

Only in European NATO circles did some skepticism remain: the medium range missiles (cruise missiles, Pershing II's and SS 20's) cannot be decoupled from the short-range missiles and conventional weapons without causing the security of Western Europe to suffer. That standpoint was also expressed by our Minister of Foreign Relations Leo Tindemans, while the entire government indeed did react positively, through its spokesman Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, to the Gorbachev proposal.

Against the background of that development, we talked with Member of the Chamber Pierre Chevalier of the SP and Rik Coolsaet of the SP research service SEVI [Study and Documentation Center Emile Vandervelde Institute]. Coolsaet has been closely following the disarmament problems for many years, while Chevalier, in the chamber group of his party, is charged with following East-West relations and sits on the Chamber Commission for Defense.

Pierre Chevalier is also part of the delegation of his party which regularly confers with socialist parties from the Benelux and the Scandinavian countries (the so-called Scandilux group). Furthermore the socialist parties of Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark have intensive contacts with the smaller

East Bloc countries Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria. In that forum also, detente in Europe is being discussed.

[Question] Has a political constellation come into being now in which the position of Florence and the cruise missiles stationed there has changed?

[Rik Coolsaet] I do indeed think so, for the simple reason that Mikhail Gorbachev apparently wants to bestow on Soviet policy with respect to Western Europe a role equivalent to that with respect to the United States. The first Belgian government which will be going to Moscow now with the cruise missiles dossier, will return with a counter move in my view. I think that the argument that we want to pursue a policy of detente in Moscow will catch on much better today than in the past.

[Pierre Chevalier] When Ruud Lubbers took that step for the placing of cruise missiles in the Netherlands, the Soviets did not react at the time. Now they might very well do so. And that makes me think that the Belgian government really decided too quickly.

[Question] Let's suppose you were in charge at Foreign Relations tomorrow--what would you do?

[Chevalier] I would go to Moscow, preferably in a Benelux context. I would try to get a concession from the Soviets, also with respect to conventional armament. Secondly, I don't know how, but I think we must try to support the current evolution in the Soviet Union. Perhaps by striving, in EC context, for a better economic cooperation with the East Bloc. We must not allow the conservatives in the Soviet Union to settle matters in their favor as happened in China.

[Coolsaet] Right now, curiously enough, an objective alliance is forming between the conservatives in the Soviet Union and the conservatives in the West. If we do not react to that positive policy in Moscow, we are presenting Gorbachev's head on a golden platter to those who themselves are against the new openness in the Soviet Union. Then Europe is on the sidelines again, and regimes such as that in Czechoslovakia will simply continue to vegetate. For already 20 years one has been talking about that Europe from the ocean to the Urals, and now an opportunity is presenting itself to take a step in that direction.

That also played a great role already in Reykjavik. At that summit, both Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev paid special attention to domestic political problems. Reagan wanted money from the Congress for the SDI research, while the big conservative criticism of Gorbachev was that he had offered too much to the West and had never received anything in return for it. Thus he went to Reykjavik either to make a good /deal/, with concessions by the Americans, or to say /no/. He did not get his good deal, and then he showed his conservatives that he can also be tough if need be.

[Chevalier] If we were in charge of Foreign Relations, we would want to return to the Harmel line and pursue a sort of neo-Gaullist policy. Thus a

policy whereby a new European emphasis is laid. The paradox, you see, is that our /Mr. Europe,/ Leo Tindemans, is pursuing all but a European policy.

[Question] Do you have an explanation for that?

[Coolsaet] I have the impression that Tindemans wants to enter history as a sort of Flemish /Spaak/. He starts out from the same dogmas as Spaak in his later period: Atlanticism comes before everything, including the EC. Tindemans thus is in favor of a European integration, but only in a the framework of an Atlantic alliance. This is similar to the time a conflict took place between De Gaulle and Kennedy, and Spaak opted for Kennedy. The dogma Atlanticism is more important than the dogma Europe.

[Chevalier] Not for us; we opt for the dogma Europe.

[Question] Do Belgian governments in fact have sufficient sovereignty to be able to make real proposals? Don't the Soviets realize right away that we are unable to get them put through in our own camp?

[Chevalier] Formally there is no problem. The alliance is after all only the sum of the sovereignties of the member countries. They remain sovereign in order to pursue their own foreign policy.

[Coolsaet] Formally, yes, but in reality, I don't know. Those small countries which make a missile proposal, run the risk of isolating themselves. Pierre Harmel at the time was able to work, he enjoyed the trust of the alliance, of the big ones. That is a problem with current governments. The opportunities to do something are limited, and precisely because of that you shouldn't hand over such a missile affair, as the Socialist Party does, and let it depend on international negotiations. It is one of the few means you have.

[Question] Isn't there a new situation now with the new Ost policy of German Foreign Affairs Minister Genscher? Wouldn't it be better at this moment for the social democrats in Europe to do business with the younger, liberal generation than with the christian democrats and the conservatives of Margaret Thatcher?

[Chevalier] Yes and no. Genscher is in any event a German phenomenon; I really can't see us discuss the missiles with our liberals.

[Question] Surely a different spirit than before emanates from the rearrangement of the military means proposed by Minister of Defense Donnea?

[Coolsaet] Annemie Neyts says it, Frank Swaelen says it, Van Miert says it: we must restructure our presence in the NATO. In that respect there appears to be growing unanimity. Also at the European level: Gorbachev, Genscher, the SPD, and we also; everyone talks about a new phase in the policy of detente. And that will no doubt be much more European than the delegated policy of detente of before. I could be mistaken, but if Gorbachev is successful in the Soviet Union, this appears to be an historic foundation. Any other attitude will be discounted as dogmatic.

Tactical Discussion

[Question] Isn't the increasing Europeanization of the policy of detente aided by the economic rivalry between the EC and the United States?

[Coolsaet] We indeed no longer find ourselves in the situation in which the United States can force us to do certain things for economic reasons.

[Chevalier] Precisely because of that it would be interesting to play upon what is happening in the Soviet Union; one can also benefit a little from that economically.

[Coolsaet] I sometimes think back to what happened in the sixties. At that time Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany were at the base of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, because they could no longer pay their NATO commitments. Now, too, that argument can be used. Lack of money is a good alibi, and it suits everybody. The Germans, the British and also the Americans themselves. Moreover, there is also a problem at the demographic level. The Germans have made a projection toward the year 2000 and they have determined that they will have too few soldiers in service at that time to meet their NATO obligations. In that manner everyone benefits by making a deal on a decrease in conventional weapons in Europe, that will become unavoidable.

[Question] After the placing of the missiles, the outcome of the elections of October 1985, the new evolution, is the SP now losing its moral leadership over the peace movement? What exactly was that missile curve last year?

[Coolsaet] What has been called the missile curve of the SP was in fact a tactical discussion which was held before congress would take place. Afterwards, the congress confirmed the previous standpoints, so that in fact nothing has changed: at the first cabinet council of a government with the socialists it is thus decided that the missiles must go, and afterward one negotiates with the Americans. But the tactical discussion did not deal with the missiles themselves, it only dealt with the question of how to acquire the power to eliminate those missiles.

With respect to the peace movement, I'm inclined to say that it is dormant. It is not possible to keep up such a mobilization for a number of years. As soon as negotiations take place in Geneva, people think that the situation has improved and then the attention weakens. But Sleeping Beauty awakens again at the first kiss, I'm convinced of that.

[Chevalier] As to that leadership, I believe we are still proving that every day. After all, we broached the question of chemical weapons, we keep the dialogue with East Europe going.

[Coolsaet] I don't have the feeling that there is distrust toward the SP in the peace movement. It expects from us that we translate politically and diplomatically what lives in the peace movement, and it is unavoidable that sometimes we have different opinions on that.

[Chevalier] From my contacts with the peace movement I have the impression that they know we are the best guarantee in the government for a policy of detente. What is important is that the left all over Europe is deliberating on the question of which direction to take. We, too, discuss that in our Scandilux meetings: we lose part of the intellectuals to the greens [ecological movement] and part of the workers to the conservatives. For whom are we still here? What are we good for?

[Coolsaet] The question as to the definition of the social democracy must indeed be asked once again. We have a number of pleasant partial alternatives--think of the foreign policy and mutual security, the Europeanization of the policy of detente--but at this moment we do not offer a truly social alternative. For us, too, there are still many matters which are not clear, with respect to work opportunity, social security. Those are topics for which we have not yet rounded the cape of 1975.

[Chevalier] Does the young voter still have a need for socialism? A clear standpoint on the missiles is good, but inadequate. How many fellow travelers do we still have? Sure, we have Hugo Claus. But we would also need people such as Bob Geldof, who stands up for Labour in Great Britain. One has to offer that type of person to the youth, people who stand for something, who represent a certain type of philosophy.

Eco[logy]-Socialism

[Question] Does the SP have a policy toward the green factor? That movement is, after all, a leftist splinter group, surely that is a leftist movement?

[Chevalier] We must accept the criticism that we don't have a policy toward the greens. We have attached too much importance to the work factor; we missed the ecological boat. We balanced work opportunity against ecology, while in fact they ought to form one entity. One does not necessarily eliminate the other. It is possible to pursue an economic policy which is also justified ecologically.

[Coolsaet] The question must be asked whether, first of all, it could have been done differently. An apparatus such as the social democracy does not incorporate those new things very rapidly. The question is whether we should not evolve toward that eco-socialism, as Oskar Lafontaine defends it in Saarland. There, the old socialism is coupled to that new ideal. I think that, in this regard, we are actually in a sort of transition phase right now.

[Question] Why do we actually strive for detente? To have a safer and happier life?

[Coolsaet] Because it is a component of a political project. Happier? You won't be happier if the tension continues. Moreover, the continuing arms race builds in instability. The international situation becomes less predictable. The danger for miscalculations increases.

[Question] Thus you believe in the threat that weapons systems ultimately become so advanced that they surpass human intellect?

[Coolsaet] To some extent, yes. With SDI, human beings put their fate in the hands of computers. Moreover, new weapons systems have a crisis-heightening effect during periods of tension. The challenge for NATO is precisely to have a stabilizing effect in case of crises. And that is not possible with SDI, nor is it possible with the cruise missiles.

Reaction of Tindemans

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 1 Apr 87 p 36

[Letter to KNACK editor by Foreign Relations Minister Leo Tindemans: "Sleeping Beauty Reawakens at First Kiss"; first paragraph is KNACK introduction; letter published in italics]

[Text] As a result of our discussion with Pierre Chevalier and Rik Coolsaet on the recent developments in the area of disarmament ("At First Kiss Sleeping Beauty Reawakens," in KNACK nr 11), Foreign Relations Minister Leo Tindemans sent us the following response.

With surprise I read the passage quoted hereafter (KNACK 18 Mar).

I quote:

"Only in European NATO circles did some skepticism remain: the medium range missiles (cruise missiles, Pershing II's and SS 20's) cannot be decoupled from the short-range missiles and conventional weapons without causing the security of Western Europe to suffer. That standpoint was also expressed by our Minister of Foreign Relations Leo Tindemans, while the entire government indeed did react positively, through its spokesman Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, to the Gorbachev proposal." End of quotes.

This is contrary to the position I have always maintained, namely that "our point of departure was always the zero-option," in accordance with my intervention in the Chamber on 6 Aug 1984.

Further, I stated as a result of Gorbachev's new proposals with respect to INF: "I am happy that the Soviet Union is giving up the globalizing of problems in connection with arms control and disarmament, that they offer the opportunity of concluding a separate accord for the cruise missiles" and "The Belgian standpoint has always been: one must not pile up the problems. If we can eliminate the cruise missiles and then start discussions on the rest, then we must do it from that viewpoint" (BRT [Belgian Radio and Television--Dutch service] radio, 3 Jan 1987).

Moreover, the question of the short range missiles is not only coming up in "European NATO circles": Mr Gorbachev stated: "as to the other operational tactical missiles, we are willing to enter into negotiations immediately with respect to their reduction and total elimination." (TASS 28 Feb.)

Respectfully,

L. Tindemans

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CSO: 5200/2525

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER 'OPTIMISTIC' ON 'ZERO-ZERO OPTION'

PM201430 Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 16 May 87 p 7

["A.G." dispatch: "Narciso Serra Expresses Understanding Toward FRG"]

[Text] Stavanger — Speaking at a news conference, Spanish [Defense] Minister Narciso Serra presented the Spanish Government's position, which has surprised most European allies by its excessive optimism. Spain supports the "zero-zero option" — the elimination of the medium- and short-range missiles deployed in Europe — though Serra added that "our position is one of understanding toward the FRG."

"If we achieve the 'zero-zero option'," he told us, "there would still be 4,500 allied nuclear warheads in Europe, so it would be possible to organize the NATO 'flexible response' strategy on this basis."

Serra's optimism extends to conventional weapons as well. The minister is aware that the Soviets enjoy a superiority over the alliance in conventional and chemical weapons but believes that instead of strengthening NATO's conventional component it is to be hoped that the USSR will negotiate a reduction of its own to achieve a balance. On the other hand several allied ministers here, including Weinberger, believe Kissinger and Nixon suspect that once the USSR has secured the elimination of the missiles that threaten its territory it will no longer have any desire to negotiate conventional troop reductions. [sentence as published]

Norwegian Defense Minister Holts said he was pleased that Serra — the other socialist at the meeting — supported his position. He said the closest positions after Spain's were Den-

mark's and the Netherlands'.

Asked about the influence of a future Euromissiles agreement on the negotiations on Torrejon, he said: "I do not deny the possibility that the U.S. 401st Wing could be part of a future redeployment of NATO forces." The problem, he added, is that "time is pressing." Serra did not discuss this with Weinberger here but he will do so "calmly and peacefully" on the occasion of the NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels in a few days' time.

The Spanish minister minimized the importance of the 72 F-16s at the Torrejon base, adding that "they constitute just a small proportion of America's conventional forces in Europe." He also said that "when we are faced with an accord of historic importance (on Euromissiles) it is difficult to discuss any other issue."

Some interpret this as an acknowledgment that as an accord on a nuclear "zero-zero option" would disrupt NATO's traditional strategy, conventional forces, especially air, would become all the more necessary.

Serra displayed a very understanding attitude toward Germany's special problems and stressed the "solidarity" that the allies and Spain must display regarding an evolution of the German position. Observers believe this could provide Spain's eventual excuse when it aligns with NATO's final position. It seems certain Spain will not want to remain isolated by its extreme stance.

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CSO: 5200/2542

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SWEDISH PAPER CRITICIZES NATO FOR LINKING INF, SRINF

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "So They Are Making Another Attempt"]

[Text] Everything does not depend on one man and one meeting. But in the usual superpower fashion, this week's visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz was said to be of very great importance to relations between the superpowers--most of the issues may be at stake. It would have been nice to feel more confident about the results.

Even the superpower setting is tragically the same as it was last fall, when the idea was to arrange for what eventually became the "preparatory meeting" in Reykjavik--when almost everything seemed possible and nothing happened. But before that, the United States and the Soviet Union had done their worst to stir up a big new diplomatic controversy following the deeply shocking arrest of American journalist Daniloff in Moscow.

A couple of days ago, both states began churning ahead full steam with mutual accusations of spying after the discovery of both the Marine Corps scandal and the extensive wiretapping of the U.S. Embassy's new building in Moscow.

That is exactly how the superpowers would act if they were trying to wreck the chances for good talks between Shultz and his Soviet colleague Eduard Shevardnadze and thereby guarantee a fiasco as far as disarmament, detente, and a new summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev are concerned. If we take it as our working hypothesis that the United States and the Soviet Union really want to achieve results, these continual cliffhangers and last-minute crises are trying for us and embarrassing to them.

It is certainly possible to speculate that every new problem reflects a lack of unity all the way up to the most central decisionmaking levels in both Moscow and Washington. We know about conflicts; we can guess at conflicts.

It appears that as far as important disarmament issues are concerned, the two superpowers are substantially closer to each other than they have been for a long time.

It seems that the USSR is no longer demanding a total ban on nuclear tests: that it is willing to consider gradual solutions which, to begin with, will clear the way for U.S. ratification of two agreements from the 1970's on the peaceful use of nuclear fission and a 150-kiloton "ceiling" on tests. Few substantial differences separate the proposals by both parties for dismantling all nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles in Europe and keeping 100 of those INF's somewhere in Soviet Asia and the United States respectively.

Since the parties are nevertheless accusing each other of having started to hinder agreements again, the simplest thing is to take a look at what has gone wrong in the case of the United States: the President is said to have backed away from the stands he took in Reykjavik. Reagan's many skeptical supporters of disarmament and somberly discouraged Soviet watchers are using an opportunity to worsen the conditions for dialogue between the two superpowers. But that opportunity itself gives cause for worry over the results.

What has happened is that the NATO revolt that was noted following Reagan's questionable negotiations in Reykjavik has intensified. The "zero option"--removing all INF's from Europe--is no longer good enough for the governments of Great Britain, the FRG, and France, a trio which Margaret Thatcher represented so convincingly during her recent visit to Gorbachev, for whom she turned on the charm and displayed an iron will.

It is true that West German Helmut Kohl has to be somewhat cautious, since his minister of foreign affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democratic Party, favors the zero option. This means that it is the French who must protest most firmly, even though Kohl thinks as they do.

What the three Western countries have now started talking about is "equal low-level ceilings." That sounds great, but it means that they are demanding--and pressuring the United States to demand--a combined agreement with the Soviet Union that would cover not only INF's but also nuclear weapons at the next lower level, just above pure "battlefield weapons" (nuclear artillery). What that might mean, for example, is that for "reasons of balance," the Americans would convert their Pershing-2 type INF's into a new Pershing-1 with a shorter range, a possibility that has aroused Soviet rage. That is the way to delay or prevent an INF agreement!

Speaking in Prague on Friday, Gorbachev proposed special talks on short-range weapons. No one should believe that the USSR is not trying to maneuver itself into a hypothetical position of power as far as certain weapon categories are concerned. Moscow's new openness with respect to on-site verification of new agreements is also dictated in part by its desire to annoy the other party with control of the type that private industry in the West loathes.

But this new attitude by its allies must not prevent the United States from mobilizing its own good will and examining the value of the Soviet Union's interest in negotiation and contact. This presupposes that the United States will take firm command within the Western alliance--for a considerably better purpose than when Washington pushed through its two-track decision on INF's in 1979. Otherwise this new attempt by Shultz does not make much sense.

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CSO: 5100/2519

DISARMAMENT SUMMIT TALKS MUST NOT IGNORE ASIA

Hong Kong HONKONG STANDARD in English 20 Apr 87 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text]

THE sounds of summitry are once more filling the air. And, as in the days preceding Reykjavik last October, American policy-makers are showing signs of over-optimism.

This is not the only similarity. Washington is as unprepared now for the new Mikhail Gorbachev initiatives as it was for his all-or-nothing gambit in the Icelandic capital.

Just as that summit was clouded by the Soviet arrest of *U S News and World Report* correspondent Nicholas Daniloff, so the present approach to another summit is beset by acrimony over mutual embassy-bugging and the subverting of marines guarding the American mission in Moscow.

All this means that American naivete is coming to the fore again and that the deep-seated mutual suspicions which did so much to torpedo the Reykjavik meeting have not been mitigated by anything since.

The positive and rapid build-up being given by Washington to the possibility of another summit may end in yet another disappointment. That will only hurt Washington more than Moscow, and deepen the division in the defence, policy and foreign affairs establishment.

With less than two years left to his final term, Mr Ronald Reagan is feeling the pressure to make his mark on nuclear disarmament. Each day that passes brings Mr Reagan's administration closer to being a lame duck where this issue is concerned.

Mr Gorbachev is badly in need of some agreement so that the money which would otherwise be expended in the renewed arms race can be used for his economic reforms. In the final analysis it would be a gross mistake to believe that he will go to any lengths to secure agreement on disarmament. Soviet security remains a top priority: the balance of terror must remain in proper equilibrium at every stage of disarmament.

Unless Americans are prepared to accept this and Mr Reagan refrains from one-upmanship, another summit will not bring the world one step back from the brink of nuclear annihilation.

Mr Gorbachev has consistently shown that he understands this far better than Mr Reagan. That is why he keeps beating the Great Communicator at Mr Reagan's own game of public relations. Mr Gorbachev is now seen as the apostle of peace and Mr Reagan as a sabre-rattling Cossack raring for war.

Moscow's agreement to on-site verification of reduction in medium-range missiles and its dropping of the condition to link such reduction to progress in other areas of nuclear disarmament have done a lot to give new momentum for continuing talks.

The Soviet offer to link talks on reduction of short-range missiles with those on medium-range nuclear arms will bring Europe into the discussions. It always was unrealistic for Moscow and Washington to talk over the heads

of the Europeans who produce their own nuclear missiles.

This link-up and the step-by-step progress towards total disarmament makes for a sounder approach than at Reykjavik. But Reykjavik showed the world the promise of a world freed from the nuclear threat.

It is something worth labouring towards, not to be rushed into. Mr Reagan must content himself with only a step forward by the time he finally leaves the White House. But no matter how small the step, it is still a move forward.

At some point, China and other nations with their own nuclear arms or the capability to produce such deadly weapons must be brought into the disarmament arena. Not to do so would be as unrealistic as concentrating on reduction of long or medium-range missiles without taking the European situation into account.

Any nuclear conflict not directly involving the Soviet Union and the Un-

ited States will still draw these two superpowers in. In the unlikely event that these two nuclear giants do not get drawn in, Chernobyl has shown what a nuclear accident can do across national frontiers.

It means that at some point the question of Asian security must be considered. Until now, European security has been preponderant. To ignore the Asian angle, as Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev have done till now, is to ignore potentially more volatile sparking points for a nuclear disaster.

The two Koreas, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Kampuchea, the Sino-Soviet border, the Iraq-Iran conflict are far more dangerous than any situation which now exists anywhere in Europe, East or West.

As in Europe, there are nuclear missiles pointed in several directions on the Asian mainland. Freedom from the nuclear threat in Europe is an empty promise without a similar freedom elsewhere in the world.

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CSO: 5250/0013

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS ON PERSHING-2 TEST--New York, 21 May (TASS)--The United States has made the test launching of a Pershing-2 missile with a training warhead. It was launched Wednesday night towards the target in the Atlantic Ocean. The launcher was served by 100 servicemen of an American Army unit stationed at the U.S. military base in Schwaebisch-Gmuend (FRG). A total of 108 such missiles are deployed in the FRG. The U.S. made the first training Pershing-2 launching in December 1985. The United States made 45 Pershing-2 test launchings, 11 of them in the current year, according to the ASSOCIATED PRESS. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0846 GMT 21 May 87 LD] /9274

SOVIET-ITALIAN TALKS--Rome, 12 May--Amintore Fanfani, chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers, has received Yu. M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, who is here in the Italian capital. During their conversation, the head of the Italian Government was informed about the Soviet stand and the state of affairs at the USSR-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. The main attention during the conversation was devoted to the possibility that has now appeared of reaching an accord on removing medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. A. Fanfani thanked him for the information and said that the Italian Government considers it essential to bring the Geneva talks to the signing of a medium-range missile treaty in the near future. The chairman of the Council of Ministers stressed that time must not be lost in this important matter. [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 87 Second Edition p 5 PM] /9274

CSO: 5200/1501

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS ANALYST VIEWS U.S. HISTORICAL STAND ON TEST BANS

LD071601 Moscow TASS in English 1540 GMT 7 May 87

[Text]. Moscow May 7 TASS -- Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Thirty years ago, on May 10, 1957, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR proposed to the United States Congress and the British Parliament to adopt agreed-upon measures leading to a termination of nuclear weapon tests.

The discussion of the problem of banning nuclear tests has a long history and abounds in examples of most diverse and often contradictory arguments set forth by Washington against the Soviet proposals to stop tests. Very often the United States went back on its own proposals and frustrated a mutually acceptable solution of the problem.

Take for example May 1957. With the knowledge of President Eisenhower the United States representative in the disarmament subcommittee Harold Stassen presented to the Soviet representative a memorandum containing some proposals which could turn out to be mutually acceptable. But representatives of the Pentagon and also the British Government, which was preparing to develop its own hydrogen bomb, opposed an agreement on banning nuclear explosions. So as a result Harold Stassen was asked by the United States President to resign. And already in July 1957 the then secretary of state of the United States John Foster Dulles announced Washington's intentions to continue nuclear tests.

The signing in 1963 of the treaty on prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space was a major success of the peace forces. But even after that the opponents of lowering the level of military confrontation continued their vicious campaign against stopping underground tests, against a general and complete prohibition of nuclear explosions.

In the course of more than eighteen months, from August 6, 1985, the Soviet Union observed a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests striving to set a good example to other countries and giving Washington a chance to ponder the consequences of a drastic destabilisation of the military-political situation as a result of an intensification of the arms race. But even in that period the United States continued intensive nuclear weapon tests at the range in Nevada, thus challenging world public opinion.

Now Washington says that the prohibition of nuclear tests is its "long-term" aim and that it can be attained "only after the elimination of all nuclear arms", that is only when nothing needing testing is left. If we are to believe Washington it comes out that to make nuclear arms obsolete it is necessary first to modernise them and that to

make them "impotent" it is necessary to increase the yield and accuracy of American nuclear warheads.

The Soviet Union is deeply convinced that a termination of nuclear explosions would sharply slow down the nuclear arms race and make it possible to embark in practice on the road of eliminating these weapons of mass annihilation. The USSR is ready for any form of negotiations with the United States on the question of ending nuclear tests, for any variant of accord -- if only this would bring closer the attainment of agreement on the banning of nuclear explosions.

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CSO: 5200/1477

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: GERASIMOV FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 7 MAY

INF Talks

LD071357 Moscow TASS in English 1349 GMT 7 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS — The 8th round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons which started in Geneva on May 5, is being held under qualitatively new conditions: After the Soviet Union put forth new initiatives aimed at reducing and eliminating a part of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate said at a briefing here today.

Earlier, the Soviet side introduced a draft treaty on liquidating medium-range missiles in Europe for the consideration of the U.S. delegation and set out a constructive position on tackling the issues of shorter-range missiles, which fully obviates obstacles to concluding a treaty on medium-range missiles.

The USSR also proposed that, along with drafting a treaty on medium-range missiles, the sides should develop "key provisions" for future agreements on issues of strategic offensive weapons, strengthening the conditions of the ABM Treaty, as well as for the start of talks on ending nuclear tests. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that all these documents, prepared in good time, could become a subject and the main political result of another summit of the Soviet and U.S. leaders.

The Soviet proposals based on the Reykjavik agreed understandings take into account concerns of the U.S. side and positions of European states, said the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman. Now it is up to the American side to respond. The progress at the talks achieved at the previous round depends now on whether the U.S. side can manifest realism, abandon tenets and stereotypes of the pre-Reykjavik period and develop a new mentality.

Statement on U.S. Leaks

PM111537 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[Untitled article under the general heading "USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement"]

[Text] A 7 May briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was devoted to questions of current politics.

G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate told correspondents that competent Soviet bodies have thoroughly checked the results of the analysis of samples of atmospheric aerosols taken outside U.S. territory in the period from February 20 to 25.

Radioactive isotopes have been detected in the samples. Their existence in the atmosphere can only be attributed to a nuclear explosion. The composition of isotopes in the samples showed that their emergence had not been due to an accident at an atomic power plant. Besides, no country except the United States conducted nuclear explosions in the period immediately before the sample-taking.

The available data made it unequivocally clear that radioactive substances spotted outside the United States were a result of nuclear explosions detonated at the Nevada test site on February 3 and 11, 1987.

Similarly, a radioactive discharge into the atmosphere was recorded when a U.S. nuclear explosion was carried out 18 March. The facts enumerated are violations of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

The Soviet Government resolutely denounced the U.S.'s violation of its international treaty commitments, said the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman. The U.S. side's attention was repeatedly drawn in the past to similar cases of radioactive fallout carried beyond U.S. national territory. The reasons the U.S. Government, shortly after the detection of radioactivity in the atmosphere as a result of the February, 1987 U.S. nuclear explosions, blamed the Soviet Union for the violations are becoming obvious.

The Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to resolve in a cardinal way the problems of nuclear testing by banning it once and for all. This step would preclude similar incidents in the future.

The U.S.' stubborn unwillingness to agree to the termination of nuclear blasts conducted with a view to developing [otrabotka] new types of nuclear weapons, including under the SDI program, is blocking advancement along this major direction of restricting the arms race.

Treaty Violation Charged

LD071320 Moscow TASS in English 1309 GMT 7 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS -- Competent Soviet bodies have thoroughly checked the results of the analysis of samples of atmospheric aerosols taken outside U.S. territory in the period from February 20 to 25.

Radioactive isotopes have been detected in the samples. Their existence in the atmosphere can only be attributed to a nuclear explosion, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, told a briefing for journalists here today.

The composition of isotopes in the samples showed that their emergence had not been due to an accident at an atomic power plant. Besides, no country except the United States conducted nuclear explosions in the period before the sample-taking.

The available data made it unequivocally clear that radioactive substances spotted outside the United States were a result of nuclear explosions detonated at the Nevada test site on February 3 and 11, 1987.

Radioactive isotopes were detected in the atmosphere close to the United States late in March. Analysis of the composition of these isotopes and the route of the movement of air masses in which they had been found showed that their source, as in the previous instance, was the March 18 nuclear blast at the American Nevada test site.

The instances when radioactive substances crossed U.S. territorial boundaries as a result of nuclear tests violated clause 1(B) of Article 1 of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

The Soviet Government resolutely denounced the violation by the U.S. of its international treaty commitments, said the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman.

These violations were a cause of special concern to the USSR due to the systematic character which they were acquiring.

The above-said violations of the 1963 treaty were not the only instances. The American side's attention was repeatedly drawn in the past to similar cases of radioactive fallout carried beyond U.S. national territory.

The Soviet Government called on the United States to do everything necessary to strictly observe provisions of this important treaty.

"The reasons why the U.S. Government, shortly after the detection of radioactivity in the atmosphere as a result of the February, 1987 American nuclear explosions, blamed the Soviet Union for the violations are becoming obvious," Gerasimov said.

"Taking advantage of the occasion, the Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to resolve in a cardinal way the problem of nuclear testing by banning it once and for all.

This step would preclude similar incidents in the future.

The U.S. stubborn unwillingness to agree to the termination of nuclear blasts conducted with a view to testing new types of nuclear weapons, including under the SDI programme, is blocking advancement along this major direction of restricting the arms race."

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CSO: 5200/1477

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. CONCEALS RADIATION LEAK FROM 10 APRIL 1986 TEST

LD090836 Moscow TASS in English 0734 GMT 9 May 87

[Text] San Francisco May 9 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yuriy Algunov reports:

The U.S. authorities applied maximum efforts in an attempt to conceal the circumstances of an accident that occurred during tests for military purposes at the nuclear Rainer Mesa test sites in Nevada on April 10, 1986.

Almost 13 months have passed before the U.S. Department of Energy, under whose authority one of the U.S. largest nuclear facilities is, has released a special report on what had happened and certified the fact of the radiation leak beyond the explosion zone.

It is clear from the document that safety hardware failed during the regular nuclear test code-named "Mighty Oak". Steel safety flaps failed to withstand the blast a minute after it was set off. As a result, underground communications system was severely contaminated with radiation. The shock wave and high temperature instantly put out of action the monitoring equipment installed in tunnels and denied the personnel of the test range an opportunity to control the situation.

Salvage teams could get down to work directly in the area of the accident only after a year. They found heavy damage, numerous obstructions and crooked equipment. During the opening of the underground silos and ventilation of the tunnels there occurred an escape of radiation into the atmosphere, which the Department of Energy hurried to call as non-hazardous.

The report on one of the most dramatic accident at the U.S. key nuclear test site, which is actively involved in the "Star Wars" programme, has been published. However, the true scope of the accident remained to be under tight wraps. It is highly probable that we will never learn the whole truth about what had happened, an official spokesman for the Department of Energy said.

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CSO: 5200/1477

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA VIEWS OIL SECTOR USE OF NUCLEAR BLASTS

PM071359 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by correspondents A. Blokhin and A. Pashkov: "Peaceful Atomic Explosions at Work"; first two paragraphs attributed to TASS; quotation marks as published]

[Text] On 19 April at 0800 Moscow time two underground nuclear explosions with a yield of up to [do] 20 kilotons were carried out in the Soviet Union's Perm Oblast.

The explosions in question were carried out in the interests of the national economy. (TASS)

IZVESTIYA's correspondent [as published] talked with N. Kobayakov, chief engineer of the "Permneft" Production Association -- for it is precisely the oilmen who have turned to the peaceful atom for help.

"The explosions were carried out in the north of the oblast, where there are petroleum deposits not easily accessible using normal methods of extraction. The petroleum bed is fragmented into isolated seams from which it is unprofitable to extract the petroleum. It is equivalent to looking for a needle in a haystack. Usually only 20 percent of the petroleum from such seams can be brought to the surface. The explosion destroys the walls of the "lenses." The minideposits combine to create as it were a single reservoir of petroleum which can be exploited to the full.

Formerly, gunpowder was used to create an explosion, but it is insufficiently effective -- although during the 11th 5-Year Plan an additional 60,000 tonnes of oil was extracted using the "gunpowder" treatment of oil-bearing strata.

I want to emphasize that the explosions are carried out at a great depth and that the bore hole is safely plugged. As was envisaged, any harmful effect on the natural environment was completely excluded. Research and the assembly of the preliminary data are now under way, which will enable us to obtain a more precise impression of this method's effectiveness.

We received an additional comment on the peaceful use of atomic energy in the bowels of the earth from specialists at the Moscow I.M. Gubkin Institute of the Petrochemical and Gas Industry and the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry.

"It is above all necessary to point out," said E. Bakirov, doctor of geological and mineralogical sciences and honored figure of science and technology, "that, as in electric power engineering, the Soviet Union is a pioneer in the use of subterranean

nuclear explosions whose aim is the intensification of gas and petroleum extraction. We carried out the first such explosions in the middle of the 1960s. The Eighth World Petroleum Congress, held in Moscow in 1971, heard two extensive reports on this problem given by Soviet and U.S. specialists. Incidentally, by that time the Americans had also carried out four subterranean nuclear explosions at gas fields.

However, work in general on the program to use subterranean nuclear explosions to exploit elusive stocks of petroleum and gas from solid petroleum asphalt was initiated in our country in the second half of the 1950s. The experience accumulated allowed the publication of a book on this problem "The Use of Subterranean Explosions in the Petroleum Industry."

"Of course, with such experiments and innovations in extraction technology" -- here V. Filanovsky, first deputy minister of the petroleum industry, joins the conversation -- "People (especially those who work directly in the oil fields) must be convinced of the full radiation safety of subterranean nuclear explosions. Exact calculations and forecasts and detailed preliminary survey work can and must guarantee this. Of course, everything associated with radiation is inherently dangerous. But even the bitter lesson of Chernobyl did not force power engineering specialists either in our country or abroad to close down nuclear power stations.

A large group of researchers and scientists is working on the elaboration of petroleum extraction using nuclear technology. And security questions are given top priority in their programs. But today we can say that the fundamental possibility of increasing the extraction of hydrocarbon raw materials from the depths of the earth with the aid of the peaceful atom has already been proved at operational fields. And this is important not only in our time but also and particularly in the more remote future.

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CSO: 5200/1477

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SWEDISH-SOVIET TV DISCUSSION AT PEACE COMMITTEE: NORDIC NFZ

LD122349 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 12 Mar 87

["Soviet-Swedish Discussion" program, presented by Yu. Rostov, held at the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace: date not specified; with Swedish parliamentarians, represented by Ingemund Bengtsson, speaker of the Riksdag, A.C. Haglund, member of the leadership of the Moderate Unity Party, L. Werner, chairman of the Swedish Left Party (Communists) and K. Bu, representative of the Center Party; and USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and other officials, represented by Genrikh Borovik, a writer and discussion program chairman, Aleksandr Yakovlevich Sukharev, RSFSR minister of justice, Konstantin Vladimirovich Enchayev Pitirim, metropolitan of Volokolamsk and Yuryevsk, Mikhail Danilovich Yakovlev, professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Valentin Grigoriyevich Sokolovskiy, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control; all participants identified by screen captions; Swedish participants speaking in Swedish with superimposed Russian translation; video shows participants seated round a rectangular table--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Rostov] This meeting took place in the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. A delegation of Swedish parliamentarians, headed by Ingemund Bengtsson, speaker of the Riksdag, as well as the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and Soviet public representatives took part in it.

[Werner] To my disappointment I learned a few hours ago that you have resumed nuclear testing. Of course, I perfectly well understand that the brunt of the criticism here should be directed at the United States. But nevertheless, my question is this: From the standpoint of scientific research and from the military standpoint, was it really essential for you to resume testing?

My second question: The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the North. You know that our country and our Riksdag have unanimously adopted a proposal that the government should work toward this. My question is this: When this question is discussed, the eminent leaders of the USSR sometimes make statements saying that there is readiness on the Soviet side to discuss the presence of nuclear weapons in the area adjoining the north [as heard]. Can anything specific be said about the measures meant by this? What measures could the USSR undertake in this case?

Is it possible--my third question--that you would be prepared to immediately remove all ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Baltic?

[Borovik] As to your second question, I will hand over to Comrade Mikhail Danilovich Yakovlev, professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Yakovlev] Mr Werner well knows the USSR's position with regard to the matter of establishing a nuclear-free zone. This is a question of great, vital importance, not only to Sweden and other northern countries, but also to the USSR. The USSR energetically supports the proposal to establish a nuclear-free North.

To supplement and develop its position, the USSR, as you know, has undertaken tangible new steps. First: We have already dismantled the launchers for medium-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula, and most of the launchers for such missiles in the rest of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts. And we have redeployed from these military districts several batteries [Diviziony] of operational-tactical missiles. In this way the previously-stated readiness of the USSR to consider the question of certain substantive measures concerning its own territory adjoining the future nuclear-free northern zone has received confirmation.

Secondly: The Soviet side supports the idea of giving nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea. If accord should be achieved between the states concerned, we could withdraw submarines fitted with ballistic missiles [as heard] from the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Third: The USSR supports the idea of possible confidence-building measures concerning Northern Europe, and proposes that a start be made on restricting the intensity of major military exercises in this region.

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CSO: 5200/1477

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: UK'S HOWE RAPPED ON REMARKS ON SOUTH PACIFIC NFZ

PM041915 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 30 Apr 87 p 3

[Vladimir Lapin "Commentator's Opinion": "Spurious Arguments"]

[Text] British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe's visit to Australia and New Zealand has once again highlighted the exacerbation of contradictions between Britain and those two major Pacific countries -- its former possessions which once submissively fulfilled London's every will.

The essence of the main disagreements lies in the different approaches to the concept of "ensuring the defense and security" of the region. As is known, the so-called Rarotonga Treaty, which proclaims the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, was drawn up on Australia's initiative. It was signed by the 13 countries of the South Pacific forum. That clear antinuclear stance provoked a storm of indignation in Washington above all, which refused to sign the protocols to the treaty. Britain, like an obedient vassal, followed its example -- which caused great regret in Canberra and Wellington.

But now, in an attempt to lend supposedly well-reasoned weight to London's position, the British foreign secretary has resorted to the "classic" method: In both capitals he set about intimidating his negotiating partners with the phantom of the "Soviet military threat." And he also put Canberra and Wellington to shame for forgetting their duty to strengthen the overall security of the "Western world." In NATO's opinion, this applies primarily to New Zealand, which is taking the "dangerous and unnecessary step" of keeping out of the country the "allies'" warships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board. Indeed, the United States has already announced the abolition of its status as an allied country, while London is talking of adopting a number of "trade sanctions."

However, the farfetched arguments of the foreign secretary, who diplomatically "forgot" that the USSR was the first to sign the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty, did not convince anyone. What is more, Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden rejected the arguments advanced by the head of the Foreign Office that Britain is prevented from signing the protocols by its "nuclear commitments" in Europe and voiced disappointment that Britain is following the United States in refusing to realize what an adverse response is elicited by their refusal to support the will of the region's island states to ensure their genuine security.

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CSO: 5200/1477

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: N-F ZONE IN SE ASIA SEEN IMPEDING U.S. ACCESS

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 19, 8-14 May 87 p 4

[Commentary by ZA RUBEZHOM observer Yu. Zhuravlev under "Our Commentary" rubric: "Pacific Ocean Realities and Western Reprisals"]

[Text] The Pacific Ocean region is again the focus of the especially close attention of the American administration. Such interest is evoked by the objective changes taking place in the political life of the region, all the more so because events are clearly not developing according to the scenario of the White House. The next session of the South Pacific Forum will be held at the end of May and beginning of June in Apia, the capital of Western Samoa. The agenda of this regional organization uniting 13 countries includes questions of cooperation in the political, economic and social areas.

The times are long gone when the Pacific Ocean was considered the boundless patrimony of the West, a kind of "American lake." "The rapid spread of antinuclear attitudes in the South Pacific is producing outspoken irritation in Washington," notes the Japanese newspaper AKAKHATA.

Back in August of 1985, the members of the South Pacific Forum declared the South Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga signed by them was a specific and real contribution to the fight against the nuclear threat. The ASEAN nations are preparing to follow their example. A summit meeting of representatives of the countries belonging to this organization and marking its 20th anniversary will be held in the Philippines in December. At this forum, it is also planned to examine the question of declaring Southeast Asia a zone free of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear arms are a very severe disease that has infected vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean through the light hand of the Pentagon. The grouping of the U.S. Armed Forces in this region already numbers a half million men, about 180 warships and more than 1,100 combat aircraft. Strategic bombers, fighter bombers, sea and land-based cruise missiles, and "Lance" missiles are all carriers of nuclear death. Numerous islands, including Guam, Micronesia, Kwajalein Atoll and others under Washington's control, serve as proving grounds for the testing of missiles and "Star Wars" components.

The transformation of Southeast Asia into a nuclear-free zone will impede the passage of American armadas with nuclear weapons on board from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and vice versa through the straits of the region and will seriously complicate the use of the main U.S. military bases in the Philippines. If one adds to this the actual collapse of the ANZUS bloc because of the antinuclear position of New Zealand, then it becomes clear why the Reagan administration is using blackmail, threats and open intervention to "bring to reason" the disobedient nations.

The United States is bestowing on its closest allies, including England and France, the functions of expeditors of American nuclear policy in the Pacific Ocean. Great Britain's Secretary of State G. Howe recently paid official visits to Australia and New Zealand. It was the first time in 15 years that such a high emissary from London had gone to this "remote area." G. Howe marked his stay with passionate appeals for vigilance. He did everything he could to convince his interlocutors of the "dangerous activity of the USSR in the region" and he sought to frighten them with the "hand of Moscow." G. Howe prophesied that without a doubt the first Soviet trawler to enter the port of Vanuatu in accordance with the signed fishing agreement would be followed by a long line of warships and that military bases would then be established, after which it is not long before the establishment of the supremacy of the Soviets.

G. Howe felt much less comfortable trying to justify the refusal of England--just as, by the way, of the United States and France--to obligate itself to honor the status of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Prime Minister of New Zealand David Lange reminded his guest that precisely Great Britain was one of the first to join in an analogous agreement in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The English minister found no better diplomatic move than to declare good-naturedly that this action was taken by the government of the Labourists. "If the question of this treaty were to arise today, I am not certain that we would make such a decision," emphasized G. Howe with vigor, exposing his government as an ardent opponent of nuclear disarmament.

Paris is repeating the arguments and tactics of Washington. Vice Admiral Tiro, commander of the French naval forces in the Pacific Ocean, did not hesitate to resort to slander: "A Soviet threat exists in the region." And therefore, he proclaimed, France should help the U.S. naval forces in some way or another. In so doing, the admiral preferred not to enlarge upon the origin of the real threat to the region: the decision made by Paris in 1985 on converting its "overseas territory" of New Caledonia into a military base and on the construction of a deep-water port in its territory. This port is an addition to a number of French military facilities in the Pacific Ocean, including a nuclear proving ground on Mururoa Atoll. Nuclear blasts still thunder there. Their number has already exceeded 80.

Still another aspect must be noted. The French administration of New Caledonia decided to finance an oppositional political grouping with pro-Western positions in the state of Vanuatu. At the same time, for the second year in a row, Paris is reducing its aid program to the legitimate government of its former colony. "Without a doubt," noted Walter Lini, prime minister of Vanuatu, "this is the revenge of Paris for the country's decisive protests against the French nuclear testing program on the Pacific Ocean atoll of

Mururoa, for its active position in the question of the granting of independence to New Caledonia, and for the independent foreign policy of Vanuatu based on the principles of nonalignment."

The Soviet Union, consistently favoring the development of relations with Pacific Ocean states, is not pursuing any secret goals and is not seeking unilateral advantages and privileges for itself. Our country has no military bases in this region and is not carrying out naval exercises and maneuvers. Our approach is the development of normal diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with the members of the Pacific Ocean community on the basis of mutual advantage, respect for independence, and sovereignty. Such relations are linked in the closest way with the creation of a climate of confidence and equal security for all. This is why the proposals that M.S. Gorbachev presented in July of last year in Vladivostok are aimed at transforming the Pacific Ocean into a peaceful nuclear-free zone, into a region of good neighborly relations and cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1471

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS ON FRENCH KERGUELEN TESTS--Antananarivo April 8 TASS--Powerful blasts rip the air on the islands of Kerguelen, Crozet, Amsterdam and Saint Paul tucked away in the southern part of the Indian Ocean. The islands form the so-called Southern Territories and the French Antarctic (TAAF). French war planners are turning this chip of the former French colonial empire into a nuclear proving ground. These developments are reported by the newspaper TEMOIGNAGE, an organ of the Reunion Communists, with a reference to a "high-ranking French serviceman." The press of littoral and insular states of the Indian Ocean writes with growing concern about French preparations on Kerguelen which are being implemented under the codename "Profil." Construction work involving the French Air Force and Navy is going there full blast. France has been engaged for long in militarization of the south-western part of the Indian Ocean. It regards the TAAF and other territories of the region as a military-strategic bridgehead which should be preserved at any cost. The key role in this plan is assigned to Reunion where over 3,000 French troops are stationed. Plans for establishing a nuclear proving ground on Kerguelen are a violation of the international treaty on Antarctic signed in 1959 and ratified by France. The document prohibits installing any nuclear facilities in the Antarctic and adjacent territories. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1156 GMT 8 Apr 87 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1477

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: SOVIET ASIAN SECURITY INITIATIVES, U.S. OPPOSITION SURVEYED

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 28 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by political observer Nikolay Pastukhov: "View of Events: Helsinki--Reference Point for Asia"]

[Text] Dear reader, take a look at the political map of the globe, direct your attention to the vast expanses of the Indian and Pacific ocean basins and to the large number of countries located along their shores. More than half of all humanity lives here. Among these countries are most of the former colonies and semicolonial territories that have now awakened, like an unchanged Prometheus, to a new life. Despite the obstacles of neocolonialism, state terrorism and the militarization of the West, they are taking their own paths (socialist, noncapitalist and capitalist) to the cherished goal of political and economic independence, freedom and equality in international relations.

But the countries of the Indian and Pacific oceans can reach this goal only under the conditions of peace and their efforts to establish collective security. Our country, half of whose territory is in Asia, clearly stated its position on this question in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the program Vladivostok speech of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and the New Delhi declaration signed by him and Rajiv Gandhi. The USSR's joining the antinuclear Pacific Ocean Treaty of Rarotonga was a new specific step in the direction of the establishment of zones of peace in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Another gratifying event in contemporary international life was the joining of the treaty by the PRC.

Further practical steps are needed to secure Asian and Pacific Ocean peace. And these steps were taken recently by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze, who in March visited the SRV, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, Australia, Indonesia and Thailand. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these visits. Whereas the states of Indochina are our close friends, this was the first visit of a minister of foreign affairs of the USSR to Canberra in the 45 years of the existence of Soviet-Australian diplomatic relations. And it has also been a long time since such high-ranking Soviet guests have been in Indonesia. The development in the countries of the Pacific and Indian oceans of a movement for peace and collective security is coalescing with the struggle of

the Soviet Union for global security. The visit of E.A. Shevardnadze became an important asset in the Soviet peace-loving policy in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region.

This policy is producing great exasperation in Washington. The articles inspired by the White House in the American press along with the wornout bugaboos about a supposed Soviet threat to Asia are dedicated, you see, to the fact that the USSR...is filling a certain "power vacuum" that arose after the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. "The United States," writes, for example, the journal NEWSWEEK, "never really recovered from this failure. Subsequently, the disagreements between Washington and its European allies on such problems as arms control and terrorism, not to mention the scandal with Iran and the Nicaraguan "contras" and the disorder arising in the White House in this connection, did not leave the administration time to think about Asia."

And again, as in the reaction to other international problems, an impudent lie. Shultz and Weinberger are traveling about the Pacific and Indian ocean countries weaving an ominous spider web. The ships of the U.S. Seventh Pacific Ocean Fleet with nuclear weapons on board are plowing Asian waters, venturing not only into the Sea of Japan but also into the Sea of Okhotsk. Washington is making great efforts to disrupt the policy of Afghanistan for national reconciliation through the massive supplying of the insurgents [dushmany] with weapons of terror. The situation is being made more tense in the Indian state of Punjab and in the vicinity of Kampuchea. The American fleet was sent to the Persian Gulf. Permanent militaristic games are being carried out in the region of South Korea. There is an increase in subversive activity in the Philippines. What "vacuum" is Washington talking about?

This is why it is essential for the Pacific and Indian ocean countries to unite and establish an effective system of collective security to avoid the nuclear catastrophe that has hung over this region of our planet and that will become a reality after the implementation of Washington's homicidal "Star Wars" program.

It should be noted that this threat, as shown by the visit of the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, is well understood in Canberra and Jakarta. In the course of the Soviet-Australian meetings, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs W. Hayden noted that if still another world war breaks out, it will not be possible to pick up the pieces. There will be no regeneration. The minister spoke highly of the new Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles, expressing the hope that it would be realized as soon as possible. The negotiations in Jakarta showed that Indonesia as well as many other ASEAN countries have a real appreciation of the situation in the world and Asia. Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Kusumaatmadja declared at the time of his meeting with E.A. Shevardnadze that the continuing uncontrolled arms race was not benefiting a single country but, on the contrary, represents a threat to the very existence of humanity. The Indonesian minister spoke out in favor of a peaceful solution to regional conflicts. In this connection, he responded with satisfaction to the steps taken to regulate the situation with respect to Afghanistan.

What is the goal of our country in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region? It is not the filling of any mythical "power vacuum" but the inclusion of this region in the overall process of strengthening international security. Our goal is not to displace the United States, which is also a country of the Pacific Ocean basin. In the Asian and Pacific Ocean region, as everywhere in the world, Moscow is striving to eliminate confrontation and to replace it with a reasonable universal approach and a policy of peaceful coexistence. This is precisely what is shown by our proposal to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles not only in Europe but also to limit their number in the Asian part of the USSR and in the territory of the United States.

The realities of our time show convincingly the necessity of a joint search for methods to ensure security in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region on the basis of bilateral negotiations, multilateral consultations and the gradual introduction into public consciousness of the idea of an "Asian-Pacific Ocean Helsinki." And it must be said that the movement in this direction is gradually gaining strength.

At the moment when these lines were written, the Beijing regional UN conference dedicated to the worldwide campaign for disarmament for the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean was taking place. Its participants recognized the necessity of developing a new political thinking in international relations and of carrying out the policy of all countries in accordance with the realities of the nuclear age. Japanese parliamentary representative M. Kobuchi declared at the conference: "Having allowed two nuclear bombings, humanity cannot allow a third." Indian physicians collected more than 25,000 signatures to an appeal calling for a fight against the nuclear threat. This document, reflecting the profound concern of Indian physicians in connection with the dangerous militaristic preparations of the international reaction, was turned over to Radjiv Gandhi for delivery to the heads of the nuclear powers.

The scheduled session of the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean is being held in New York. The UN General Assembly charged the committee with carrying out the practical preparations for an international conference planned for next year in Colombo (Sri Lanka) that is called upon to put into effect the UN declaration proclaiming the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In the course of the discussion, the delegates, including representatives of China and Sri Lanka, came out against the militaristic preparations in this extensive part of the globe and advocated the elimination of all existing foreign military bases there. The Western delegations, however, did everything possible to delay the work of the committee and to impose on the discussion far-fetched questions unrelated to the essence of the matter. The impression is created that, as before, they will make another attempt to disrupt the holding of the conference. On 25 March in Tokyo, New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister G. Palmer declared to the Japanese newspaper ASAKHI that his government will consistently adhere to its policy prohibiting ships with nuclear weapons on board from entering the country's ports. He noted that New Zealand has no intention of departing from this course.

And finally, a seminar of the Indian public organization "For Security in Asia" was held in New Delhi on 23 March. Its participants unanimously spoke

out against the increase in the military threat in Asia and against the attempts of international imperialism to transform the Asian-Pacific Ocean region into an arena of confrontation. The Indian publicist V.D. Chopra, who spoke at the seminar, stressed that the New Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons was an example of the new approach to the resolution of the most important questions of the day. The implementation of the proposals contained in this document by all countries will permit humanity to survive and to teach all peoples to live in a new and truly civilized world.

The ice was broken, as they say. The peoples of the Asian-Pacific Ocean region are awakening and the day is not far off when they will draw up their peace charter similar to that of Helsinki.

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